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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the application of a secure group communication 
architecture to a swarm of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  A multicast 
secure group communication architecture for the low earth orbit (LEO) satellite 
environment is evaluated to determine if it can be effectively adapted to a swarm of 
UAVs and provide secure, scalable, and efficient communications.   
The performance of the proposed security architecture is evaluated with two other 
commonly used architectures using a discrete event computer simulation developed using 
MatLab.  Performance is evaluated in terms of the scalability and efficiency of the group 
key distribution and management scheme when the swarm size, swarm mobility, 
multicast group join and departure rates are varied.  The metrics include the total keys 
distributed over the simulation period, the average number of times an individual UAV 
must rekey, the average bandwidth used to rekey the swarm, and the average percentage 
of battery consumed by a UAV to rekey over the simulation period.   
The proposed security architecture can successfully be applied to a swarm of 
autonomous UAVs using current technology.  The proposed architecture is more efficient 
and scalable than the other tested and commonly-used architectures.  Over all the tested 
configurations, the proposed architecture distributes 55.2 – 94.8% fewer keys, rekeys 
59.0 - 94.9% less often per UAV, uses 55.2 - 87.9% less bandwidth to rekey, and reduces 
the battery consumption by 16.9 – 85.4%. 
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A SECURE GROUP COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE FOR A 
SWARM OF AUTONOMOUS UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 
I. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
A swarm of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has great potential to 
provide benefits in a variety of applications, especially in the Department of Defense 
(DoD) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission. UAV swarm 
applications include continuous border patrol, battlespace surveillance, mapping routes 
for troop movement, real-time information distribution to mobile military units, and 
extending communications via an airborne network.  Grouping UAVs into a swarm 
allows them to carry a range of sensors with an array of capabilities, creating a diverse 
group that can overcome the limited field of view of a single UAV [KeJ06].  A swarm 
also increases reliability through redundancy.  Recently, UAVs have made significant 
contributions to the Global War on Terrorism and demand for them is only expected to 
increase, especially as swarming technology develops and matures [OSD05]. 
Previous UAV swarm research improved communication efficiency and 
effectiveness, with little emphasis on security [HyM07, YaB06, KeJ06].  However, the 
sensitivity of UAV swarm applications necessitates a secure communication architecture 
that provides DoD-mandated information assurance.  With this added security 
component, a swarm of autonomous UAVs can provide a unique and powerful net-
centric asset to support the warfighter. 
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1.2 Overview and Goals 
 
Securing communication in a UAV swarm is of the utmost importance.  Without 
it the swarm is vulnerable to malicious acts such as traffic analysis, denial of service 
attacks, or masquerading by adversaries.  In the worst-case, these acts could lead to 
human casualties.  With that said, the cost of securing a UAV swarm, given its limited 
resources, needs to be efficient and scalable so the mission can still be accomplished.  
Secure communications is not as complex for only a few UAVs.  However, providing 
secure communication for a large, dynamic swarm of UAVs is significantly more 
complex.   
This thesis focuses on a significant aspect of securing group communication in an 
autonomous UAV swarm; providing an efficient and scalable architecture for group 
rekeying needed for encrypting and decrypting group communication.  This research 
expands on the Hubenko architecture [HuR07], which develops a multicast secure group 
communication architecture for low earth orbit (LEO) satellite networks in the global 
information grid (GIG).  This architecture can be effectively adapted to a swarm of 
UAVs to provide secure, scalable, and efficient communications.   
The goals of this research are to investigate the feasibility of using the Hubenko 
architecture to provide a secure, scalable, and efficient multicast architecture for UAV 
swarms, and to evaluate the security performance of the Hubenko architecture applied to 
a swarm of UAVs compared to two other commonly used security architectures.  
1.3 Thesis Layout 
This chapter introduces the research topic and the motivation behind the effort.  In 
Chapter 2, background information and fundamental concepts are presented as well as 
2 
recent work in the topic area.  Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used to carry out the 
experiments.  Chapter 4 provides discussion and analysis of the experimental results.  
Chapter 5 draws conclusions about the results and offers areas for future research. 
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II. Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents fundamental concepts and recent research in the areas of 
UAVs, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), multicasting technology, secure and 
scalable multicast architectures, and the GIG.  Section 2.2 defines UAVs and discusses 
autonomy, UAV swarms, and their possible applications.  Section 2.3 introduces 
MANETs and discusses their relationship to UAV swarms.  Section 2.4 presents 
multicasting technology, multicast groups, multicast routing protocols, multicast security, 
and group key management.  Select multicast architectures are discussed including an 
overview of the Hubenko Architecture.   Section 2.5, provides an overview of the GIG 
and describes how satellite and UAV communications can fit into this model.   
2.2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
2.2.1 Overview 
UAVs have been around for decades and have been used in a variety of roles in 
both military and commercial applications.  The DoD defines a UAV as: 
A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses 
aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be 
piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal 
or nonlethal payload.  [DoD01] 
Recently, UAVs have made significant contributions in the Global War on Terrorism, 
including support in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  These 
diverse systems, which cost a few thousand dollars to tens of millions of dollars, are 
capable of performing a wide range of missions without endangering the military’s most 
valuable asset--its people [OSD05]. 
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UAVs in the military are typically used for ISR missions, although they have also 
provided substantial support to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), situation 
development, battle management (BM), battle damage assessment (BDA), and rear area 
security (RAS) [Glo07].  Combat UAVs, known as UCAVs, have the additional 
capability to deliver weapons and are useful for high-risk missions. 
 Along with the array of roles, UAVs come in many different shapes and sizes 
with varying capabilities.  The Air Force’s Global Hawk is the largest operational UAV 
with a wingspan of 35.3 meters and an approximate weight of 11,600 kg [USA05b].  This 
is in contrast to some of the smallest UAVs, which are insect-sized “mesicopters”, and 
miniature “smart dust” sensors [DeU05].  These tiny systems are broadly designated as 
Miniature Aerial Vehicles (MAV) measuring less than 15 cm in any dimension.  Between 
these two extremes is a class of small UAVs (SUAV), which typically weigh under 50 kg 
and are powered by a battery or liquid fuel engine.  Tables 1 and 2 outline UAVs and 
SUAVs respectively currently employed by the DoD along with their characteristics 
[OSD05].   
 Table 1. Selected UAVs and their Characteristics [OSD05] 
UAV Weight (kg) 
Wingspan 
(meters) 
Payload 
Capacity (kg) 
Radius 
(km) 
Endurance 
(hrs) 
Ceiling 
(meters) 
Global Hawk (RQ-4A) 12,160 35.4 886 10,000 32 20,000 
Predator 4,773 20.1 341 3,704 16 - 30 15,240 
Hunter (RQ-5A) 736 8.9 91 266.7 11.6 4,572 
 
 Table 2. Selected Small UAVs and their Characteristics [OSD05] 
UAV Weight (kg) 
Wingspan 
(meters) 
Payload 
Capacity 
(kg) 
Engine 
Type 
Radius 
(meters) 
Endurance 
(minutes) 
Power 
(Watts) 
Ceiling 
(meters) 
Desert Hawk III 2.7 1.37 1.0 Battery 10,000 90+ 120 – 300 305 
Pointer 3.8 2.74 0.45 Battery 11,000 120 145 – 300 305 
Raven 1.8 1.32 0.9 Battery 11,000 90 80 – 200 305 
Dragon Eye 2 1.17 0.45 Battery 4,600 45 - 60 110 - 200 305 
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The capabilities of SUAVs and MAVs currently in operation are limited by their 
size, unlike larger UAVs and manned aircraft.  SUAVs have a communication range of 
about 10 km for the data link, which is dependent on battery power.  The video link is 
line of sight (LOS) and is usually the first link to be lost.  These links typically range 
from 1.6 km – 11 km.  The smaller the UAV the less battery power, processing power, 
data storage capacity, and data link capability it will have, thereby restricting the 
communication range and data processing capabilities. 
Despite the fact that SUAVs and MAVs have limited capabilities, the technology 
is advancing.  Many of the above limitations are improving and UAVs of all sizes and 
types are becoming much more attractive and feasible.  Operational commanders and 
senior military officials recognize the full worth of UAVs and their contributions to the 
missions.  This is due in part to several recent technological advances such as [OSD04]: 
• Dramatic increases in computer processing power 
• Battery and other energy storage systems are becoming more efficient, cheaper, 
and lighter in weight 
• Sensor technology advancement including reduced sensor size and weight, 
increased resolution, and the detection of fixed and moving targets under harsh 
environmental conditions 
• Improved communications, image processing, and image exploitation capabilities 
In additional to these technological advances, there are other factors that are making 
UAVs vital future platforms [OSD04]: 
• Political and public pressure to minimize casualties and capture of aircrews 
• Emerging requirement for continuous persistent surveillance of the battlespace 
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• Their proven worth in the Global War on Terrorism 
Another area where UAVs have significant potential is when they are used in 
autonomous swarms.  The application of swarm theory to UAVs has generated 
significant interest, especially among military researchers.  The potential for groups of 
UAVs to sense and respond autonomously, without human intervention, is very powerful.  
Autonomous UAVs and UAV swarms are discussed in the next two sections. 
2.2.2 Autonomous UAVs 
 Autonomy is commonly defined as the quality or state of being self-governing or 
having the ability to make decisions without human intervention [Mer07].  UAVs have 
varying degrees of autonomy.  When UAVs were first developed they were often referred 
to as drones, because they were simply remote controlled aircraft, with no autonomy 
whatsoever.  UAVs considered to be “fully autonomous” have been developed, such as 
the Army’s RQ-11 Raven.  However, the use of the term fully autonomous herein means 
being able to take-off, fly, and land without human intervention.    
 What actually constitutes full autonomy is not yet agreed upon.  For example, 
several federal agencies including the Department of Defense Joint Program Office, the 
Air Force Research Laboratory, the U.S. Army Science Board, the Army Maneuver 
Support Center, and National Institute of Standards and Technology all have their own 
definitions and degrees of autonomy for various programs.  This has given rise to the 
creation of the Federal Agencies Ad Hoc Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems 
(ALFUS) Working Group [Nat04].  ALFUS defines autonomy as: 
The unmanned system’s own ability of sensing, perceiving, analyzing, 
communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting, to achieve its 
goals as assigned by its human operator(s) through designed human-robot 
7 
interaction. Autonomy is characterized into levels by factors including 
mission complexity, environmental difficulty, and level of HRI to 
accomplish the missions.  [Nat04] 
 
 The directors of the Service Research Laboratories have defined their own levels 
of autonomy for unmanned aircraft (UA) in the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 
[OSD05].  Figure 1 shows these 10 levels along with examples of where UAVs currently 
in operation fall.   
 
Figure 1.  Autonomy Levels of UAVs as defined by the OSD [OSD05] 
 
As can be seen from the figure, all of the higher levels of autonomy are characterized by 
collaborative group behavior and fully autonomous swarm technology is expected in the 
next decade.  The autonomous UAV swarm concept is discussed in the next section. 
2.2.3 UAV Swarms 
 With UAV research and development evolving at a rapid pace, an autonomous 
swarm of UAVs for military applications is receiving much interest.  Swarm is usually 
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identified with a group of living organisms who arrange themselves to cooperate to 
achieve a common task that could not be completed as an individual [KeJ06].  In the 
context of this research, a UAV swarm consists of a heterogeneous group of autonomous 
UAVs working together (cooperatively) to accomplish a common task or mission.   
 A swarm of autonomous UAVs has great potential in a variety of applications.  
The area that is getting the most attention and research is ISR.  Applications of UAV 
swarms include, but are not limited to:  continuous border patrol, battlespace 
surveillance, mapping routes for troop movement, real-time information distribution to 
mobile military units, and extending communications by providing an airborne network.  
Grouping UAVs into a swarm allows them to carry a range of sensors, with an array of 
capabilities, creating a diverse group that can overcome the limited field of view of a 
single SUAV [KeJ06].  The swarm also provides increased reliability through 
redundancy. 
 A Host of Armed Reconnaissance Vehicles Enabling Surveillance and Targeting 
(HARVEST) [AuM06] is theoretically capable of autonomous refueling, cooperative 
search, information fusion, and munitions employment.  HARVEST consists of a 
heterogeneous group of small to medium size UAVs equipped with various payloads, 
some with munitions and some with sensors for data collection.  The core cooperative 
functions include localization, area search, and data routing with potential applications to 
include target tracking, active decoys, tactical networking, terrain mapping, and 
environmental hazard plume detection [AuM06].  A swarm of UAVs such as HARVEST 
is a specific type of mobile ad hoc network (MANET).  Therefore, MANETs are 
presented in more detail in the next section. 
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2.3 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
 A MANET is system of mobile hosts connected by wireless links, the union of 
which forms a communication network modeled in the form of an arbitrary 
communication graph [DeG03].  MANETs are of great interest to the military because 
there are many situations where there is no fixed infrastructure network and it is not 
feasible to build or maintain.   
 MANETs are complicated systems because they lack any fixed infrastructure, in 
contrast with more traditional wireless networks where mobile nodes communicate via 
fixed access points or base stations.  The mobility of nodes in a MANET causes the 
network topology to change often and can be very unpredictable.  As the mobility of the 
nodes increases, the protocol overhead necessary to support the changing network 
increases as well.  This is important since most nodes in a MANET rely on batteries, and 
are therefore limited by power.  The limited power necessitates an efficient 
communication method.  One way to achieve efficient communications in a MANET is 
through multicast communication.   
2.4 Multicasting 
Multicasting is a set of technologies that allow a source node to send data to 
multiple destination nodes simultaneously while transmitting only a single copy of the 
data on to the network [SuH03].  The data is replicated for the destination nodes only 
when necessary.  While multicasting can be applied to different layers of the OSI stack, 
the term typically refers to multicasting at the network/IP layer (IP Multicasting) 
[Wik07a].   Multicasting is ideal for group communications because it allows a source 
node to efficiently send data to a large group of users. 
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Multicasting is often grouped with unicasting, broadcasting, and anycasting as a 
kind of network layer communications.  Unicasting transmits data from a single source 
node to a single destination node.  This type of communication is appropriate for 
applications such as downloading content from a web site.  However, for group 
applications, unicasting can be very inefficient because the source needs to transmit a 
separate message for every member of the group.  Broadcasting transmits data from a 
single source node to every node on the local network.  This can also be inefficient 
because it sends data to every node on the network even if the intended group is only a 
small subset.  This results in a significant amount of wasted bandwidth.  Anycasting 
transmits data from a single source node to one or more of a group of destination nodes, 
usually the closest.  While anycasting has its place, it is not suitable for group 
communications, where all the members of the group need to receive the data. 
 In a MANET where efficiency is a very important factor due to limited resources 
such as power and bandwidth, multicasting can be very beneficial since multicasting 
efficiently uses network bandwidth and reduces processing load on the source.   
2.4.1 Multicast Communication Process and Requirements 
Implementing multicast communications on a network can be a very complex 
process.  There are several requirements and components of this process that must exist 
to successfully establish multicast communications.   
The first requirement for multicasting is the existence of multicast supported 
routers within the network to route packets.  With multicasting still in its infancy, most 
Internet routers do not support IP multicast.  However, this will soon change with the 
adoption of IPv6, in which IP multicast will be a standard feature [Wik07b].  In the mean 
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time, the multicast backbone (M-bone) supports IP multicasting over the Internet.  M-
bone is a virtual network laid on the existing backbones that operate the Internet and 
intranets [WoD07].  It uses a subset of the class D address range (224.0.0.0 to 
239.255.255.255) for multicast traffic.   
Another requirement for multicast is the identification of the receivers, or the 
group.  Hosts that would like to join a multicast group must identify themselves to the 
network. This is called the registration process, and it is facilitated with the unique set of 
IP addresses (mentioned above) that are reserved specifically for multicast 
communications [Spi03].  This process is managed by a special group management 
protocol, which will be described in a later section.   
After the receivers join their respective groups, the network must deliver multicast 
traffic using a multicast routing protocol, which is the final component to the multicasting 
process.  The routing protocol determines the appropriate forwarding paths to all 
members of the multicast group.  The protocol also determines when it is necessary to 
replicate data, so that the information can be received in multiple locations 
simultaneously [Spi03].  Group management protocols and multicast routing protocols 
are described in more detail in the following sections. 
2.4.2 Multicast Groups 
 The purpose of multicasting is to transmit data to a group of users, thus the routers 
must know who constitutes the multicast group.  Membership in a multicast group must 
be dynamic, allowing hosts to enter and leave the multicast session without the 
permission or knowledge of other hosts [Kru98].  Hosts must also be allowed to belong to 
more than one group at a time.  These key features of multicasting are managed by a 
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group membership protocol.  The most popular protocol is the Internet Group 
Management Protocol (IGMP).   
 IGMP supports three main types of messages: Report, Query and Leave.  An 
IGMP Report message is issued by a host wishing to join a multicast group and includes 
the IP multicast class D address of the multicast group.  An IGMP Query message is 
issued by the multicast router to hosts on its network to determine whether the hosts still 
wish to receive multicast traffic.  An IGMP Leave message is issued by a host when it no 
longer wishes to receive multicast traffic for that group.   
 Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) is another multicast group management 
protocol used in the IPv6 protocol suite.  MLD is similar to IGMP although it uses 
different message types.  Until IPv6 is widely implemented, IGMP will be the 
predominate group management protocol for multicast. 
2.4.3 Multicast Routing Protocols 
A multicast routing protocol is an intelligent control panel mechanism that 
efficiently delivers data from the first hop router (FHR) to all of the participating last hop 
routers (LHR) [Spi03].  The FHR is the router closest to the source of the multicast 
traffic, while the LHRs are the last routers in the path to the receivers.  The best multicast 
protocol ultimately depends on the particular application.  There is no single multicast 
protocol that outperforms all others in all applications.  Each protocol has its own 
strengths and weaknesses.   
When considering which multicast protocol to implement, the following 
properties are desirable for most applications:  low cost with respect to processing power; 
low end-to-end delay; scalability; ability to support dynamic group membership; 
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survivability in terms of network, link, or node outages; and some level of fairness to all 
members [SaM00].  The next section presents an overview of the most popular multicast 
protocols in use today followed by multicast protocols best suited for a MANET.  
 2.4.3.1 Multicast Protocols suited for MANETs 
 There are several well established protocols which provide efficient multicasting 
in the fixed, wired environment, such as Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol 
(DVMRP), Multicast Open Shortest Path First (MOSPF), Protocol Independent Multicast 
- Sparse Mode (PIM-SM), and Protocol Independent Multicast - Dense Mode (PIM-SM) 
[WaP98, MoP94, FeH06, AdN05].  However, adapting these to a mobile ad hoc 
environment is challenging and not always feasible.  Although existing multicast support 
for fixed users can be applied to a wireless environment, there are many issues that make 
this challenging including limited bandwidth, higher rate of packet loss, higher rate of 
membership changes, changes in routing structure, unpredictable topology, and limited 
battery life [Var02].   
 Most multicast routing protocols for MANETs fall into one of the following 
categories:  tree-based, meshed-based, stateless multicast, or a hybrid of these.  Many of 
the protocols used in fixed, wired environments are tree-based and stateful protocols 
because the routers can maintain the distribution trees.  Tree-based multicast protocols 
for MANETs are similar.  In this type of protocol, a source-based or shared tree is used 
among the group and only one path exists between any pair of nodes.  Examples of tree-
based ad hoc multicast protocols include Ad Hoc Multicast Routing Protocol Utilizing 
Increasing ID Numbers (AMRIS) [WuT98] and Multicast Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance 
Vector (MAODV) [RoP00].   
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 Mesh-based protocols establish a mesh-like structure, which contains multiple, 
redundant routes between nodes for robust handling of link failures or node mobility.  
Examples of mesh-based ad hoc multicast protocols include Core-Assisted Mesh Protocol 
(CAMP) [MaG99] and On-Demand Multicast Routing Protocol (ODMRP) [YiL02]. 
Stateless multicast protocols avoid the overhead of creating and maintaining the 
delivery tree, or mesh, by explicitly including the list of destinations in the packet header.  
These protocols are tailored for small group multicast and assume the underlying routing 
protocol takes care of forwarding the packet to respective destinations based on the 
addresses contained in the header [DeG03].  A pure flooding protocol is an example of a 
stateless multicast protocol along with more optimized stateless protocols such as 
Differential Destination Multicast (DDM) [JiC01].   
 Hybrid protocols attempt to combine the robustness of meshed-based protocols 
with the efficiency of tree-based protocols.  Examples of hybrid protocols are Ad Hoc 
Multicast Routing Protocol (AMRoute) [BoM98] and Multicast Core Extraction 
Distributed Ad Hoc Routing (MCEDAR) [SiS99]. 
 De Morais Cordeiro, Gossain, Agrawal [DeG03] compared several protocols 
proposed for multicasting in mobile ad hoc networks based on the following factors:  type 
of topology, possibility of loop formations, dependence on a unicast protocol, whether 
control packets are flooded throughout the network or limited to the multicast group, and 
whether paths are created on demand, or if optimal paths are determined once and 
updated periodically as needed.  In a harsh environment, where the network topology 
changes very frequently, mesh-based protocols outperformed tree-based protocols due to 
the alternate paths, which allowed multicast data to be delivered to all or most multicast 
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receivers even if some links failed.  Hybrid protocols were suitable for medium mobility 
networks by taking advantage of both a tree and a mesh structure.  Stateless multicast is 
promising for supporting multiple small multicast groups [DeG03].  
2.4.4 Multicast Security 
 The security of multicast communication can be as important, if not more 
important, than performance and efficiency.  This is especially true in the military.  
Before discussing the specifics of securing multicast communication in a MANET, some 
basic security concepts warrant further review. 
Whether discussing wired versus wireless, unicast versus multicast, or 
infrastructure versus ad hoc, there are basic security services that should be built into all 
communication architectures to protect the information.  The three basic components of 
computer security are [Bis03]: 
• Availability:  the ability to use the information or resource desired,  
• Confidentiality:  the concealment of information or resources, and 
• Integrity:  the trustworthiness of data or resources. 
The NSA has defined five pillars of Information Assurance (IA), which includes 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, plus: 
• Non-repudiation:  a service that provides proof of the integrity and origin of 
information, and 
• Authentication:  the ability to verify the identity of the user, device or other entity.  
 In addition to the security services defined above, there are security services that 
are unique to a multicast environment.  These services include: 
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• Group Key Secrecy:  the guarantee that it is computationally infeasible for an 
adversary to discover any group encryption key [AyS06], 
• Forward Secrecy:  new members are not able to read past traffic [BrR02], 
• Backward Secrecy:  former members are not able to read present and future traffic 
[BrR02], and 
• Group Access Control:  ability to permit or deny membership into multicast 
groups [JuA02]. 
 For secure wireless multicasting, cryptography and key management schemes are 
needed, in which cryptographic keys are used to encrypt and decrypt messages.  Public 
key cryptography is a secure mechanism used exchange encrypted messages, but is 
computationally expensive.  In a multicast protocol when the amount of data to be 
transmitted is large, or when the devices involved in communication cannot perform 
computationally-intense exponentiations, symmetric key cryptography can secure 
communications [LaP06].  This will be the case in UAV swarms until public key 
cryptology is no longer a significant burden on a UAV’s limited resources.   
Symmetric key cryptography requires all group members to use the same 
decryption key.  This shared decryption key is called the Session Encryption Key (SEK) 
or Traffic Encryption Key (TEK).  Since everyone shares the SEK, members need to hold 
additional Key Encryption Keys (KEK) that are used to securely distribute the SEK to 
each valid member [LaP06].  The key management scheme manages and distributes keys 
in addition to ensuring only legitimate members of the multicast group hold valid keys 
and can access the group data during a multicast session.   
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 The dynamic nature of MANETs increases the complexity and overhead of 
managing this process.  To preserve the secrecy of the multicast data, the SEK needs to 
be updated upon certain events such as a member joining and leaving the group.  For 
secure multicasting in a wireless environment, other factors heavily impact the ideal key 
management scheme such as:  battery power, bandwidth, constraints, host mobility, loss 
of packets, and wireless security issues [AyS06]. 
 Encryption and digital signatures provide adequate confidentiality, integrity, and 
authentication.  Because these security mechanisms have proven to be very effective 
when implemented properly, the majority of the literature focuses security concerns on 
protecting the key material [Kru98].  The protection, management, and distribution of the 
key material is discussed in the next section.  
2.4.5 Group Key Management 
 Group key management is a significant component of secure multicast 
communication and has a large impact on scalability.  The distribution and management 
of the cryptographic keys is one of the most challenging issues in multicast security.  
There has been significant research in this area, and like routing protocols, the best key 
management scheme depends upon the application.   
A group key management scheme defines the key agreement mechanism at the 
beginning of a multicast session.  Additionally, it defines the successive key exchanges 
during a session when the group changes without rebuilding the group [BrR02].  This 
operation is usually defined as the rekeying operation and completely characterizes a key 
management protocol [BrR02].  Group key management schemes can be categorized into 
three main groups [RaH03]: 
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• Centralized:  A single entity controls the whole group, hence the group key 
management protocol seeks to minimize storage requirements, computational 
power on both clients and servers, and bandwidth utilization. 
• Decentralized:  The management of a large group is divided among subgroup 
managers, to minimize the problem of concentrating the work in a single place. 
• Distributed:  There is no explicit key distribution center, and the members 
generate keys. All members perform access control and the generation of the key 
can be either contributory, meaning that all members contribute some information 
to generate the group key, or keys can be generated by one of the member of the 
group. 
 Although there has been much research in the area of group key management, 
there has been little on schemes which provide secure multicast communications in 
mobile ad hoc networks.  The next section discusses multicast schemes which have the 
potential to contribute to a new secure and scalable multicast architecture suitable for a 
MANET.   
2.4.6 Select Secure, Scalable Multicast Architectures 
 A variety of solutions have been proposed to provide a secure and scalable 
multicast architecture.  Each has its strengths and weaknesses, and applications in which 
it can be best applied.  The approaches most applicable to this research are reviewed in 
the following sections. 
 2.4.6.1 GOTHIC 
 As mentioned above, group access control is one of the necessary services for 
secure multicast.  Under ordinary IGMP, any host wishing to gain access to a multicast 
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group and its data can do so by submitting a JOIN request.  Thus, eavesdropping, theft of 
service, and denial of service (DOS) attacks can occur.  Any viable solution to this 
problem must provide a group policy management system and a group member 
authorization system.  The group policy management system has a group owner who 
provides a list of authorized members and other appropriate security policies for the 
group to the access control server (ACS) [JuA03].  The group member authorization 
system provides the core control of the architecture by controlling access to the group 
[JuA03].   
 GOTHIC is a comprehensive architecture that provides group access control 
[JuA03].  It contains a group policy management system and a group member 
authorization system.  The GOTHIC group policy management system occurs first.  A 
host wishing to be a group owner submits a request to the ACS.  The ACS authenticates 
and authorizes the group owner via the group owner determination and authorization 
system (GODAS).  The GODAS ensures the host attempting to provide the group policy 
is really the group owner.  Implementation depends on the particular multicast allocation 
address scheme.  Once the GODAS ensures the host is actually the group owner, the 
group policy is submitted.  The ACS may be a single system or distributed across several 
systems.  After the group policy is in place, the group member authorization system 
controls access to the multicast data.  More specifically, a host wishing to join the group 
submits an authorization request to the ACS signed with the host’s private key, which 
contains the group ID and the host’s public key certificate [JuA02].  The ACS checks the 
group policy to determine whether the host has access rights to join the group.  If it does, 
it is authenticated and given an expiration time. 
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 Another key feature of GOTHIC is the group access control aware group key 
management (GACA-GKM).  GACA-GKM leverages the trust built into the group 
access control system to reduce the requirements of the group key management scheme 
and obtain substantial overhead reductions [JuA03].  GACA-GKM has three basic rules 
[JuA02]: 
1. If a host h joins multicast session G from a trusted subtree that has previously 
been part of the multicast tree for session G, a rekey must occur. 
2. If a host h leaves multicast session G from a trusted subtree that will remain part 
of the multicast tree for session G, then a rekey must occur. 
3. Otherwise, there is no need to rekey. 
For example, if a new member, host A, is on a shared broadcast link with current group 
member, host B, then a rekey must occur when A joins since A had access to the 
distribution tree before it became a member.  Also, if a leaving member, host C, is on a 
shared link with current member host D, then a rekey must occur when C leaves 
otherwise it will have access to the distribution tree after it is no longer a member.  These 
three rules include users in the same trusted subtree in addition to users on a shared 
broadcast link due to the possibility of eavesdropping in the form of wiretaps and 
network sniffing [JuA02].  This feature saves a tremendous amount of rekeying overhead 
and therefore, can significantly increase the scalability of the secure multicast 
architecture.  The designers of Gothic created the architecture with low computation 
overhead at the routers, low message overhead, and low support infrastructure 
requirements [JuA02].  These attributes are ideal for resource-constrained MANETs and, 
in particular, UAV swarms.   
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 2.4.6.2 Spatial Clustering 
Another recent multicast architecture that shows great promise is called “Spatial 
Clustering” [BaB02].  While GOTHIC provides group access control, spatial clustering 
focuses on group key management.  The Spatial Clustering architecture reduces the 
overhead involved when group members join or leave the group by dividing the multicast 
group into subgroups based on their physical location.  These subgroups are independent 
of each other and have their own group leader and their own secret group key.  Each 
subgroup is managed by a group security agent (GSA), which work together with other 
GSAs to bridge the local multicast traffic from each subgroup into all of the other 
subgroups as needed [Hub06].  At the head of the entire hierarchy is a group security 
controller that is responsible for managing all of the GSAs and the overall security of the 
group.   
Under the normal flat multicast architecture where there are no subgroups, the 
entire multicast group must rekey when a join or leave occurs.  Every rekey operation 
incurs O(N) key distributions, where N is number of members in the group.  It is easy to 
see that this flat architecture does not scale well to large, dynamic groups.  Thus, by 
creating a hierarchical architecture, as Spatial Clustering does, each independent group 
need rekey only when there is a change in its own subgroup.   
 Other schemes, such as Iolus, use a similar subgrouping concept, but the 
subgroups are based on predetermined administrative boundaries [Mit97].  Spatial 
Clustering dynamically forms the subgroups and assigns group leaders.  Because these 
assignments are base on location, the key distribution scheme can exploit the parallelism 
inherent in different parts of a multicast tree and greatly enhance performance [BaB02]. 
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 2.4.6.3 Hubenko Multicast Security Architecture for GIG Environment 
 The Hubenko architecture is a secure group communication architecture that 
combines the key features of the well known multicast architectures in a way that 
increases system scalability for secure multicast in a LEO satellite environment [HuR07].  
One of its key features is clustering.  The best features of Spatial Clustering, discussed in 
Section 2.4.6.2, and Iolus [Mit97] are combined to form the basic framework of the 
Hubenko architecture.  Multicast groups are divided into subgroups (clusters) based on 
the physical location of its members.  By using spatial boundaries the key distribution 
scheme can exploit the parallelism inherent in different parts of a multicast tree to greatly 
enhance performance [BaB02].  Using the Iolus framework, all of the clusters are 
independent and each cluster has its own group leader and SEK.  As a result, if a new 
member joins or leaves the multicast group, only the affected cluster needs to rekey as 
opposed to the entire multicast group.  Each cluster is managed by a GSA, known as a 
cluster leader in this research.  The cluster leaders work with other cluster leaders to 
bridge the local multicast traffic from each cluster into all of the other clusters as needed 
[Mit97].  At the head of the entire hierarchy is a group security controller that manages 
all of the cluster leaders and the overall security of the group.   This is the job of the 
satellites in the Hubenko architecture.  The number and size of the clusters as well as the 
number of levels in the hierarchy is flexible depending on the application.    
To further increase system scalability, the Hubenko architecture incorporates 
many of the key features of Gothic, discussed in Section 2.4.3.1.  The GACs from Gothic 
are used to strengthen the security of the system by preventing unauthorized users from 
attempting malicious acts such as traffic analysis or denial of service attacks.  GACA-
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GKM is also incorporated, which significantly improves scalability and efficiency, 
through less frequent rekeying by taking advantage of the trust built into the GAC system 
[HuR07].  For example, in a typical group key management system, whenever a user 
joins or leaves a multicast group, the entire system is rekeyed since the new user could 
have accessed either the old encrypted data prior to arrival or to new encrypted data after 
departure.  GAC ensures no unwanted users have access to the data prior to their 
validated join or after their departure.  Thus, a rekey is not needed in either of these 
situations [HuR07].  
Figure 2 shows a conceptual model of the Hubenko architecture in a LEO satellite 
environment.   
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Figure 2.  Hubenko Architecture [HuR07] 
 
The LEO satellites are represented by satellite figures, the group keys are represented by 
the letters, and the users are represented by the numbers.  In this architecture, LEO 
satellites form a cluster at the top of the hierarchy with a group key “V”.  The users are 
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further divided into clusters, with a different group key for each cluster.  The Hubenko 
architecture is a modular design.  As a result, the underlying multicast routing protocol 
and rekeying protocol are transparent and can be selected to best fit each unique 
application.  Although this architecture has been applied to a LEO satellite system, due to 
its modularity it can also be scaled to provide a secure, scalable multicast architecture for 
UAV swarms in the GIG. 
2.5 Global Information Grid 
The DoD is currently in a great transformation that will reorient the military and 
focus its attention on emerging and future missions, change the way they operate and 
fight to leverage Information Age concepts and technologies, and change business 
processes to create an Information Age organization [AlH03].  To achieve this 
transformation soldiers, platforms, weapons, sensors, computers, and communications 
systems must be connected to share strategic, operational, and tactical information in 
real-time.  To make this transformation a reality, the DoD is in the process of building the 
infrastructure for this net-centric environment known as the GIG.  The DoD defines the 
GIG as:  
…the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, 
associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, 
disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, 
policy makers, and support personnel.  The Global Information Grid 
includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and 
services, software (including applications), data, security services, other 
associated services and National Security Systems.  [DoD01] 
This network is increasingly becoming one of the most important contributors to combat 
power and protection.  The GIG provides the communications backbone to carry out net-
centric operations and enables users to exploit the tenets of the net-centric warfare 
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doctrine.  Conceptually, the GIG will be similar to the Internet.  However, there will be 
less dependence on ground-based, fixed systems and equipment to transmit and route 
data, and more dependence on space-based and mobile, ad hoc systems to carry out these 
functions [GAO04].  Figure 3 is a conceptual view of the GIG including nominal assets. 
 
Figure 3. Global Information Grid Assets [RoM05] 
 
There are several layers that make up the GIG’s infrastructure.  Hubenko [HuR06b] 
defines and decomposes the GIG into four communications infrastructure “Layers”:    
• Surface Layer:  contains wired and wireless communication assets for both 
tactical and strategic functions 
• Aerospace Layer:  contains tactical communication assets typically functioning 
within a theater of operation 
• Near-Space Layer:  contains the high loiter assets such as UAVs, primarily 
functioning as reconnaissance assets 
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• Satellite Layer:  hosts orbiting satellite assets and provides a robust, high speed 
backbone in space 
Hubenko [HuR06b] focused on enhancing the satellite layer by taking advantage of LEO 
satellites, which provide greater communication efficiency compared to other satellite 
systems.  These systems are discussed in the following section. 
2.5.1 Satellite Communications in the Global Information Grid 
 Satellites are a well established, mature technology, and will be a major part of 
the GIG’s infrastructure.  These nodes enable real-time information transfer to and from 
the warfighters and decision-makers while removing geographic constraints associated 
with fixed terrestrial infrastructures [HuR06b].  Satellites are typically differentiated 
based on the size and orbital path (circular or elliptical).  The three main types of circular 
orbit satellite systems are Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO), LEO, and Medium earth 
orbit (MEO).  GEO satellites provide narrowband, wideband, and protected 
communication capabilities [HuR06b].  These satellites orbit at an altitude of 
approximately 35,000 km.  Only three are needed to provide near full earth coverage.  
However, coverage around the polar regions (beyond 20 degrees north and south latitude) 
is degraded.   
 LEO systems operate at a much lower altitude than GEOs.  LEO satellites 
typically orbit at an altitude of about 1000 km.  Unlike GEO satellites, which are fixed 
relative to the Earth, LEO satellites travel across the Earth and only provide coverage of a 
particular spot for a few minutes.  Thus, 40+ systems are needed to provide full earth 
coverage, including the polar regions.  A hand off must occur between satellites if a 
transmission between the satellite and user takes longer than a few minutes.  However, 
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because of the lower operational altitude, the propagation times are greatly reduced.  
Aside from shorter propagation delay, LEO systems also minimize the possibility of a 
lost transmission because they provide coverage of every spot on Earth by at least two 
satellites at any given time.  In addition, smaller ground equipment is required for end 
users making these systems ideal for mobile users.   
 MEO, another category of circular orbit satellites, falls between GEO and LEO 
systems.  MEO satellites typically orbit at an altitude of 10,000 km and provide a view of 
a particular spot for several hours.  While, fewer satellites are required to provide full 
earth coverage compared to LEO systems, the higher altitude increases the propagation 
delay.  More detailed descriptions of these systems can be found in [HuR06b].   
 GEO systems, in particular, are most commonly associated with the GIG 
compared to LEO and MEO systems.  However, Hubenko [HuR06b] proposes enhancing 
the satellite layer of the GIG by incorporating more LEO systems for the following 
reasons: 
• GEO can provide near-real-time performance, while LEO systems can deliver 
real-time performance for voice and video transmissions. 
• LEO systems can achieve average end-to-end latencies of less than 100 ms for 
intercontinental communications using satellite crosslinks.  
• Real-time voice and video communications for tactical users in the field is an 
increasing requirement, which LEO satellites are better able to provide. 
• LEO systems can provide “Power to the Edge.”1  
                                                 
1 “Power to the edge” empowers individuals, or edge devices, at the edge of an organization (where the 
organization interacts with its operating environment to have an impact or effect on that environment) 
[AlH03] 
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In addition, LEO satellites can provide a gateway for other assets in the GIG such as 
UAV swarms.  The closer proximity coupled with the smaller communication equipment 
may allow SUAVs to reach out to a LEO satellite to connect to the GIG when a ground 
station is not available or is a less efficient means of communicating. 
2.5.2 UAV Communications in the Global Information Grid 
 With the GIG emerging as the future platform to conduct all information 
operations, UAV communication must be seamlessly integrated to exploit all of their 
capabilities.  UAVs are employed in a variety of roles, where information is the central 
focus, whether the information is being sent, received, acquired, or processed.  In almost 
all circumstances, this information is sensitive and needs to be protected, making 
information assurance (IA) a crucial requirement of UAV communication.  While, UAVs 
such as the Global Hawk are large enough to support the required storage capacity, 
processing power, and data links to provide secure long-range communications, SUAVs 
are much more constrained.  This makes a secure, scalable, and efficient communication 
architecture crucial to the incorporation of SUAVs and UAV swarms into the GIG.  The 
research done in the area of satellite communications in the GIG [HuR07] can scale to or 
extend to UAVs and may provide the key to efficiently securing their communication. 
2.6 Summary  
 This chapter presents the fundamental concepts and recent research in the areas of 
UAVs, MANETs, multicasting technology, multicast architectures, and the GIG.  UAV 
related topics such as autonomy, swarms, and MANETs are discussed.  Next, 
multicasting technology is introduced along with group management, multicast routing 
29 
protocols, multicast security, and group key distribution.  Secure and scalable multicast 
architectures that can provide secure and efficient communication in a UAV swarm are 
studied.  Finally, the GIG and description of how satellites and UAVs can fit into this 
model is also presented.   
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents the methodology used to evaluate the security performance 
of three different security architectures applied to a swarm of autonomous UAVs.  First, 
the problem definition, goals and hypothesis, and approach are discussed in Section 3.2.  
Section 3.3 defines the system boundaries.  The system and its services are described in 
Section 3.4 followed by a detailed description of the workload in Section 3.5, the 
performance metrics in Section 3.6, the parameters in Section 3.7, and the factors in 
Section 3.8.   Then, the evaluation technique is discussed in Section 3.9 followed by a 
description of the simulation environment in Section 3.10.  Section 3.11 provides an 
overview of the experimental design.  Finally, the technique used to analyze and interpret 
the data is covered in Section 3.12. 
3.2 Problem Definition 
3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis 
For UAV swarms to be powerful net-centric assets, they must be capable of 
secure, efficient, and scalable communication.  Chapter 2 discusses several challenges to 
providing secure, efficient, and scalable communication in UAV swarms, highlighting 
the complexity of the problem.  The security of the UAV swarm must be the top priority.  
Without it the swarm is vulnerable to malicious acts such as traffic analysis, denial of 
service attacks, or masquerading by adversaries, which in the worst-case could lead to 
human casualties.  The cost of securing the UAV swarm, in terms of its limited resources, 
needs to be efficient and scalable so the swarm can still carry out its mission effectively.  
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Securing communication among only a few UAVs is not very complex.  However, 
providing secure communication for a large, dynamic swarm of UAVs is significantly 
more complex.   
This thesis focuses on a significant aspect of securing group communication in an 
autonomous UAV swarm; providing an efficient and scalable architecture for group 
rekeying.  This research expands on previous work by Hubenko [HuR07], which 
developed the Hubenko architecture discussed in Section 2.4.6.3.   
The goals of this research are to: 
• Investigate the feasibility of using the Hubenko architecture to provide a 
secure, scalable multicast architecture for UAV swarms in the GIG, and 
• Evaluate the security performance of the Hubenko architecture in a swarm 
of UAVs compared to two other commonly used security architectures.  
It is hypothesized that the Hubenko architecture can be effectively adapted to a 
swarm of autonomous UAVs, while providing significant performance improvements in 
terms of group key management compared to two other commonly used security 
architectures.  It is also hypothesized that the Hubenko architecture provides the most 
performance improvements in large, highly mobile swarms with high rates of joins, 
departures, and rejoins. 
3.2.2 Approach 
The Hubenko architecture combines key features of well known multicast 
architectures in a way that increases system scalability for secure multicast.  Although 
this architecture has been applied to a LEO satellite system, this research investigates the 
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feasibility of using the architecture to provide a secure, scalable multicast architecture, 
which constitutes the approach for this research.   
The Hubenko architecture applied to a UAV swarm is shown in Figure 4.  
  
Figure 4.  Hubenko Architecture Applied to UAV Swarm 
 
A large UAV, such as a Global Hawk, has a similar role as the LEO satellite does in the 
original Hubenko architecture.  The Global Hawk is the group security controller and 
group ACS, responsible for the overall security of the entire swarm.  “GK” represents the 
multicast group key shared among the cluster leaders and the Global Hawk.  Clusters are 
formed based on spatial boundaries to maximize communication efficiency.  Each cluster 
has its own cluster key represented by “CKn”.  The black lines represent communication 
links while the circles with thick lines represent cluster boundaries.  The dashed lines 
represent the implementation of GACA-GKM on the Global Hawk, which communicates 
with the cluster leaders to manage access to the group.  Instead of satellite spot beams 
dictating the number and size of the clusters, cluster boundaries are constrained by the 
capabilities of the UAVs selected as cluster leaders.  That is, the radio transmission range 
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is dependent on numerous factors including transmission power, receiver sensitivity, and 
antenna design.  These factors will vary from UAV to UAV.   
When a multicast group first forms, the Global Hawk assigns UAVs as either 
cluster leaders or cluster members based on their capabilities and location.  Ideally 
medium sized UAVs are assigned as cluster leaders, because they have greater range, 
endurance, and processing capabilities.  The UAVs selected as cluster leaders 
communicate with the Global Hawk flying at an altitude of about 15 km and all of the 
UAVs in their respective clusters.  To increase available bandwidth and avoid 
transmission collisions, the cluster leaders loiter above their clusters and use directional 
antennas aimed at their cluster.  The cluster leaders communicate amongst each other to 
keep their clusters from overlapping. 
Although large autonomous UAV swarms are still in the concept stage, it is 
important to ensure the technology exists to allow the proposed communication 
architecture to be applied.  This research assumes the swarm consists of a secure Global 
Hawk, several medium-sized UAVs (such as the Hunter) as cluster leaders, and largely, 
SUAVs (such as the Desert Hawk) and MAVs.  Based on the capabilities of these UAVs, 
displayed in Table 1 and  Table 2, the Global Hawk operates at about 15 km, the 
medium-sized UAVs at about 4 km, and the SUAVs at about 300 meters.  In the worst-
case scenario, when medium-sized UAVs are not present to act as intermediary routers, a 
SUAV may need to be capable of a communication range of up to 15 km to communicate 
directly with the Global Hawk.  Using current radio and battery technology, this 
communication range is feasible [Ubi07, Gru07].  This issue is further discussed in 
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Appendix B, which provides specific details on the representative battery and radio 
including their capabilities. 
The other architectures evaluated in this study are the baseline and the cluster.  
The baseline architecture for a swarm of UAVs is a flat model, consisting of the swarm 
and the multicast group leader, which is the Global Hawk.  It includes the basic security 
functions of key generation, key storage, key agreement, and group key distribution to 
provide a dynamic application proof-of-concept [HuR07].  The entire swarm shares a 
single SEK and thus every swarm member is rekeyed on a member join or departure.   
The cluster architecture is an enhanced baseline architecture that includes the 
clustering concepts from Spatial Clustering and Iolus.  Each cluster is independent and 
has its own unique SEK.  As a result, each cluster only needs to be rekeyed when there is 
a join to, or departure from its cluster. 
The work by Hubenko in [HuR07] provides insight into the impact of the 
multicast group size and mobility on each of the investigated architectures.  However, the 
activity and characteristics of the multicast groups modeled in that work do not reflect a 
realistic scenario for a swarm of UAVs.  Hubenko’s study models a multicast group 
whose members join within a fixed time, with some of the members leaving after random 
intervals.  This is visually represented by Scenario 1 in Figure 5.  There may be some 
applications when this model properly characterizes a UAV swarm, but the multicast 
activity represented by Scenario 2 in Figure 5 is a better model of a UAV swarm’s 
activity.  Scenario 2 in Figure 5 represents a multicast group with continuous departures, 
and rejoins to the group.  Most of the envisioned missions of UAV swarms (continuous 
border patrol, battlespace surveillance, ISR, etc.) require the swarm sustains itself for 
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prolonged periods of time.  This could be several hours or even several days.  Currently 
SUAVs which comprise the bulk of the swarm, have limited battery life typically ranging 
from 1 to 3 hours [OSD07].  Therefore, in order for the swarm to sustain its strength and 
size, its members will need to depart and rejoin several times throughout the duration of 
the mission to replace or recharge batteries. 
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Figure 5. Tested Scenarios 
  
Thus, this study tests the Hubenko architecture under Scenario 2 in addition to 
Scenario 1, to represent different mission requirements placed on UAV swarms.  The 
scenarios are distinguished by the multicast group activity over the simulation period.  
Scenario 1 represents the scenario where UAVs join the swarm and must depart after 
their batteries are depleted.  None of the departing UAVs rejoin the group.  In Scenario 2, 
the UAV swarm joins the multicast group, but there are continuous departures and rejoins 
over a longer period.  The burden of continuous departures and rejoins to the multicast 
group fully test the architectures for a UAV swarm.   
3.3 System boundaries 
The System Under Test (SUT) is the UAV Swarm Group Communication 
System.  A block diagram of the SUT is shown in Figure 6.  It consists of the following 
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components:  the security architecture, wireless network, UAVs, and the multicast 
routing protocol.  The component under test (CUT) is the security architecture.  
Specifically, the Hubenko architecture is compared to a baseline architecture and a 
clustered architecture.   
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Figure 6.  UAV Swarm Group Communication System 
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Workload parameters include the size of the swarm (multicast group), the group 
join rate, the group departure rate, the swarm’s mobility, the number of clusters, and the 
length of the group key.  The system parameters consist of the transmission range, 
bandwidth, the physical layer and MAC standard, battery power, processing capabilities, 
cluster diameter, and UAV speed.  These parameters are discussed in more detail in 
Section 3.7.  The metrics of the system consist of the total number of keys distributed 
over the simulation period (total keys), the average number of times a UAV must rekey 
(average rekeys), the average amount of bandwidth used to rekey (average bandwidth), 
and the average percentage of battery consumed to rekey (battery consumed).   
In addition to the assumptions stated in Section 3.2, this study assumes there are 
no obstacles to UAV travel or communication and a reliable routing protocol is in place.  
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It is also assumed the UAVs are equipped with transceivers capable of successfully 
communicating over the necessary transmission range. 
3.4 System Services 
 This system provides a secure multicast communication network service for a 
swarm of autonomous UAVs.  This service is successful when encrypted multicast traffic 
reaches all intended nodes and only those nodes.  For this to occur, the underlying 
security architecture must successfully distribute encryption keys to all group members 
and perform rekey operations as necessary, such as when a join or departure to the 
multicast group occurs.  Based on the assumptions such as sufficient bandwidth and a 
reliable routing protocol, failures modes such as dropped packets are not considered. 
3.5 Workload 
 The workload of the SUT is the amount of multicast traffic to be distributed.  This 
study specifically focuses on reducing the traffic associated with group key management 
and distribution.  Thus, the amount of multicast traffic related to group key management 
depends upon several parameters including the size of the swarm, the group join rate, the 
group departure rate, the swarm’s mobility, the number of clusters, and the length of the 
group key.  The workload to the SUT is generated by varying these parameters.  For 
example, increasing the swarm size, the group join rate, the group departure rate, and the 
swarm’s mobility increases the amount of rekey operations over the simulation period 
necessary to secure the swarm.  As a result, the overall amount of multicast traffic 
increases, thus increasing the workload to the SUT.  On the other hand, decreasing the 
swarm size, the group join rate, the group departure rate, and the swarm’s mobility 
38 
decreases the amount of rekey operations over the simulation period, thus reducing 
multicast traffic and the workload to the SUT.   
3.6 Performance Metrics  
As group key management is one of the most complex and resource intensive 
operations on the network, the performance metrics should measure how efficient and 
scalable the security architecture is in terms of group key management.  Thus, the 
following performance metrics are defined: 
• Total Keys:  The total number of keys distributed during the simulation 
period, and 
• Average Rekeys:  Average number of times a UAV must rekey during the 
simulation period.  
Similar metrics were used to evaluate the performance of the Hubenko architecture in the 
LEO satellite environment as well as related work in the area of secure group 
communications [Hub06].  These metrics are also relevant to determining potential 
security performance improvements [HoI04, RaH03, Hub06].  In addition to the metrics 
listed above, Scenario 2 also measures: 
• Average Bandwidth:  The average amount of bandwidth used to rekey for a 
group rekey operation, and 
• Battery Consumed:  The average percentage of battery consumed by a UAV to 
rekey during the simulation period.  
These metrics are very important in an environment such as an autonomous UAV swarm 
where battery capacity and bandwidth can be limited and costly, and further emphasize 
the cost associated with rekeying.  The assumptions made, and the calculations used for 
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average bandwidth and battery consumed can be found in Appendix A and Appendix B, 
respectively. 
3.7 Parameters 
 The parameters of the system are the properties, which when changed can impact 
the performance of the system.  These include both system parameters, which 
characterize the system, and workload parameters, which characterize the workload.  The 
system and workload parameters for the SUT are further described, with the fixed 
experimental parameters displayed in  Table 3.   
 Table 3.  Fixed parameter values 
Parameter Scenario 1 Value Scenario 2 Value 
PHY/MAC Standard IEEE 802.11b IEEE 802.11b 
Bandwidth 11 Mbps 11 Mbps 
Transmission Range 15 km 15 km 
Processor Speed 1.8 GHz  1.8 GHz 
UAV Speed 25 m/s 25 m/s 
UAV Battery Capacity 4200 mA-hr 4200 mA-hr 
Group Key Length 256 bits 256 bits 
Number of Clusters 10 10 
Cluster Diameter 10 km 10 km 
Simulation Length 7200 time steps (2 hrs) 43200 time steps (12 hrs) 
 
3.7.1 System Parameters 
 
• Transmission Range:  This is the maximum distance over which two nodes can 
successfully communicate directly.   This is highly dependent on the UAV’s 
battery, radio, and antenna.  The representative radio is the SuperRange9, which 
features proven non-line-of sight distances over 20km [Ubi07].  This research 
assumes UAVs are capable of communicating up to distances of 15 km. 
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• Bandwidth:  The channel bandwidth restricts how much data can be transmitted to 
the swarm per second.  IEEE 802.11b has a maximum bandwidth of 11 Mbps. 
• Battery Capacity:  This affects the ability of the UAVs to generate and distribute 
keys and multicast data.  UAVs used in similar research are currently equipped 
with a Thunder Power Lithium Poly battery TP4200-4S2PB, with a usable voltage 
range from 14 to 16.7 V [Gru07]. 
• PHY/MAC Standard:  The physical layer and media access control standards 
define channel access and data encoding, modulation and transmission.  IEEE 
802.11b is a widely known technology and the current standard of choice for 
similar research [Pac07]. 
• Processor Speed:  This also affects the ability of the UAVs to generate and 
distribute keys and multicast data.  UAVs used in similar research are currently 
equipped with a Kontron 1.8 GHz processor with 1 GB memory [Gru07]. 
• UAV Speed:  UAV speed impacts how fast and to what degree the network 
topology changes.  A reasonable speed given the expected size and 
maneuverability of a typical UAV in HARVEST is 25 meters per second 
[AuM06]. 
• Cluster Diameter:  This is a function of the antenna, transmission range, and 
altitude of the UAV chosen as the cluster leader and affects the swarm’s coverage 
area.  Based on these constraints the cluster diameter is chosen to be 10 km. 
3.7.2 Workload Parameters 
• Swarm Size:  In this study the swarm size is synonymous with the multicast group 
size.  The number of UAVs in the swarm can impact the cluster density, the total 
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number of keys which need to be distributed, in addition to the overall multicast 
traffic generated. 
• Group Join Rate:  The rate at which UAVs join the multicast group significantly 
impacts the overhead necessary to maintain overall security of the swarm. 
• Group Departure Rate:  The rate at which UAVs depart the multicast group 
significantly impacts the overhead necessary to maintain overall security of the 
swarm. 
• Swarm Mobility:  For the baseline architecture, mobility will not affect the need 
to rekey the group, because clusters do not exist and all UAVs are rekeyed by the 
same key server.  However, mobility in the Cluster and Hubenko architectures 
significantly affects the number of rekeys, because each cluster is rekeyed 
separately.  Thus, a highly-dynamic environment where UAVs are flying across 
several clusters, requires much more rekeying overhead than an environment 
where UAVs loiter in the same general area for long periods of time.  
• Group Key Length:  This affects the security of the system as well as the size of 
the packets generated to rekey the multicast group.  Larger keys increase the 
security of the system, but require more bandwidth, processing power, and 
storage.  This study assumes a key length of 256 bits, which is a standard length 
for AES encryption. 
• Number of Clusters:  This impacts the scalability, efficiency, and communication 
overhead required in the Cluster and Hubenko architectures.  The ideal number of 
clusters varies depending on the situation and may be constrained by resources 
since each cluster is managed by a cluster leader, which requires more battery 
42 
power, processing power, storage, and endurance.  Since cluster analysis is 
beyond the scope of this research, the number of clusters for this study is set at 10 
to allow for comparison to previous work [HuR07]. 
• Simulation Length:  Longer simulations have more activity such as joins and 
departures and more mobility among the clusters.  The simulation length for 
Scenario 1 is 2 hours which is the typical endurance of smaller UAVs.  The 
simulation length for Scenario 2 is 12 hours.  This represents UAVs having the 
ability to swap out batteries and rejoin the swarm after a certain amount of time. 
3.8 Factors  
 This section outlines the factors selected from the system and workload 
parameters.  These factors are varied to determine the impact they have on the 
performance of each security architecture evaluated.  Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the 
factors chosen and their levels for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 respectively. 
Table 4. Factor Levels Scenario 1 
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Swarm Size 40 100 200 500 
Swarm Mobility  25% 75%   
Group Join Rate 15% 30%   
Group Departure Rate 25% 75%   
Security Architecture Baseline Clustered Hubenko  
 
 
Table 5. Factor Levels Scenario 2 
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
Swarm Size 40 100 200 500 1000 
Swarm Mobility  25% 50% 75% 90%  
Security Architecture Baseline Clustered Hubenko   
 
• Swarm size:  The number of UAVs in the swarm impacts the total number of keys 
to be distributed and also increases the overall activity of the swarm, thereby 
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increasing the number of times a UAV needs to rekey.  Based on proposed UAV 
swarms and possible missions the levels selected are 40, 100, 200, and 500 
UAVs.  Scenario 2 also includes 1000 UAVs to further increase the workload. 
• Swarm Mobility:  This is the percentage of the swarm that is highly mobile.  In 
this study, UAVs are defined as highly mobile if they travel outside of a 5 km 
radius, whereas UAVs that stay within a 5 km radius are defined as loiterers.  A 
highly mobile environment requires much more rekeying overhead than one in 
which UAVs loiter in the same general area for long periods of time.  The levels 
selected for Scenario 1 are 25% and 75%.  In addition to these levels, Scenario 2 
includes 50% and 90% swarm mobility levels.   
• Group Join Rate:  This is the percentage of the simulation time it takes for the 
entire swarm has initially joined the multicast group.  The rate at which UAVs 
join the multicast group impacts the overhead necessary to maintain overall 
security of the swarm.  The levels chosen are 15% and 30%.  Thus, when the rate 
is set to 15%, there will be several more joins to the multicast group in a shorter 
amount of time compared to when the rate is sent to 30%.  The group join rate for 
Scenario 2 is fixed. 
• Group Departure Rate:  This is the percentage of the swarm that departs the 
multicast group prior to the end of the simulation.  The number of departures from 
the multicast group has an impact on the overhead necessary to maintain overall 
security of the swarm.  The levels chosen for Scenario1 are 25% and 75%.  The 
UAVs that depart the group do so after a normally distributed amount of time.  
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The group departure rate for Scenario 2 is not a factor because it is set to 100% 
for all of the simulations. 
• Security Architecture:  This is the CUT.  The security architecture impacts the 
total number of rekeying operations and the overall security performance of the 
system.  The levels selected are the baseline (flat architecture), cluster, and 
Hubenko. 
3.9 Evaluation Technique  
Currently a swarm of autonomous unmanned vehicles is still in the concept stage and 
an actual system is not yet fielded.  Thus, measurement of an actual system is not feasible 
for this study.  In addition, using an actual system, if one existed, would be very costly 
and time consuming.  Using an analytical model is also not a viable option, because there 
is no such model that can be adapted to this scenario. 
The best evaluation technique for this study is simulation.  Both OPNET Modeler 
and MatLab tools have been considered for performing the simulation.  Because this 
study is specifically concerned with reducing security overhead in the form of group key 
management, much of the details about data transmission, packets, and routing can be 
abstracted away.  This makes MatLab the best choice to perform the simulation for this 
study.  
A discrete event computer simulation using MatLab‚ (version R2007a) is 
developed to evaluate the relative performance of the baseline, cluster, and Hubenko 
architectures in terms of group key management and distribution in a swarm of UAVs.  
The characteristics of the UAV swarm are modeled in MatLab using structures which are 
initialized based on random variables and probability distributions appropriate for each 
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factor.  Matrices track performance metrics which are saved as Excel files.  The data 
from the Excel files are imported into Minitab where plots and figures are created for 
post-simulation analysis.  These simulations can be reproduced on any workstation with 
MatLab version R2007a.  The simulation environment is further described in Section 
3.10. 
The results of the simulation are validated by comparing them to related work in 
[Hub07].  Furthermore, using literature and other work done with group key 
management, certain scenarios can be validated.  For example, increasing the number of 
joins and departures to a group should increase the number of rekeys. 
3.10 Simulation Environment 
The simulation environment developed for this research is a modified version of 
the one used in [Hub07], which modeled a satellite-based multicast network.  Several 
modifications to the simulation were made to characterize a swarm of UAVs and this 
study’s experimental design.  Although a detailed description of the original simulation 
environment can be found in [Hub07], several significant modifications are described 
below. 
In the original simulation the time steps were left undefined, however for the 
purpose of this research one time step represents one second.  This means if a UAV joins 
the multicast group at the beginning of the one second interval it will not receive a 
multicast key until the end of the interval, thus having to wait up to one second to start 
receiving multicast data.  The same logic applies to a UAV leaving the multicast group.  
If a UAV leaves the multicast group at the beginning of the one second interval it still 
may be able to receive multicast data for up to one second because the rest of the UAVs 
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in the multicast group will be rekeyed at the end of the one second interval.  In actual use 
applications larger or smaller intervals can be used depending on the security needs of the 
system.  The length of the rekey interval also effects the amount of traffic in the entire 
system.  See Appendix C for a more detailed explanation.   
Another important modification is how the metrics total keys and average rekeys 
are calculated for the baseline study.  Because the original study dealt with a 
geographically widespread satellite environment, the baseline architecture required a 
rekey operation anytime a user moved from one spot beam to another whether or not the 
user was already a member of the multicast group.  However, in this study the baseline 
architecture is a large UAV acting as the single multicast group leader with a swarm of 
smaller UAVs locally spread out within its range.  Because it is assumed that the 
multicast group leader can directly and/or indirectly transmit to all members of the 
swarm, there is no need to rekey as swarm members move within that range.  For 
example, the highly mobile UAV in Figure 4 would not cause a rekey in the baseline 
study because the clusters are non-existent and Global Hawk acts as the multicast group 
leader for the entire swarm. 
The simulation environment is also modified to simulate both scenarios.  The 
original study only simulated the multicast group activity of Scenario 1 shown in Figure 
5.  Aside from the changes mentioned above both scenarios required changes to the 
experimental parameters and factors to correspond to the experimental design.   
3.10.1 Scenario 1 Simulation 
In Scenario 1, two hours or 7200 discrete time steps of rekeying activity in a UAV 
swarm is simulated.  During each simulation run all factors (join rate, departure rate, 
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swarm mobility, and swarm size) are held constant, but the three architectures are tested 
under the same conditions.   Each UAV is randomly assigned an initial join time to the 
multicast group, an initial cluster, a mobility type (highly mobile or loitering), and a 
departure time (if applicable).  All of the random assignments are based on a uniform 
distribution.   The group join rate determines whether the UAVs randomly join within the 
first 15% or 30% of the simulation time.  The group departure rate determines the 
percentage of the swarm that departs the group before the end of the simulation (either 
25% or 75%).  The swarm mobility rate determines the percentage of the swarm assigned 
as highly mobile or loiterers.  The UAVs assigned as highly mobile change clusters 
throughout the simulation based on their velocity of 25 m/s, while the UAVs assigned as 
loiterers remain in their initial assigned cluster.  The metrics total keys and average keys 
are tracked for each individual UAV for each of the three tested architectures. 
3.10.2 Scenario 2 Simulation 
In Scenario 2 12 hours or 43200 discrete time steps of rekeying activity in a UAV 
swarm is simulated.  This scenario allows UAVs to rejoin the multicast group after 
departing and models the situation where a UAV swarm needs to be sustained for a long 
period of time, longer than a UAV’s typical battery life.  Thus, UAVs depart the swarm 
to recharge or exchange their batteries and then rejoin the group.  The join rate is not a 
factor and is held constant (all UAVs join within the first hour).  The departure rate is 
also not a factor in this scenario because all UAVs continuously depart and rejoin the 
multicast group, therefore making it 100%.  Similar to Scenario 1, the swarm mobility 
and swarm size are held constant during each run and the three architectures are tested 
simultaneously under the same conditions.    
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In the beginning of the simulation each UAV is randomly assigned an initial join 
time during the first simulated hour (3600 time steps).  Each UAV is also randomly 
assigned a duration (battery life) ranging from 30 minutes to 180 minutes to represent 
various battery capacities, typical of a heterogeneous swarm.  This represents the battery 
capacities of the various SUAVs currently in operation as can be found in the DoD’s 
Unmanned Systems Roadmap [OSD07].  Each UAV is randomly assigned to an initial 
cluster and as highly mobile or loitering.  After a UAV initially joins the multicast group 
it stays for its randomly assigned duration and then departs.  It then rejoins the swarm 30 
minutes later representing the time to swap out its battery.  This is repeated throughout 
the simulation.  The metrics total keys, average keys, average bandwidth, and battery 
consumed are tracked for each individual UAV for each of the three tested architectures. 
3.11 Experimental Design  
 The overall experimental design for this study consists of two sub-experiments, 
each with a full-factorial design with the factors stated above.  The first sub-experiment, 
Scenario 1, consists of 8 repetitions for each configuration, requiring a total of 768 
simulation runs (4 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 3 * 8 = 768).  The second sub-experiment, Scenario 2, 
consists of 20 repetitions for each configuration, requiring a total of 1200 runs (5 * 4 * 3 
* 20 = 1200).  Thus, the overall experiment consists of 1968 simulation runs.  The 
number of repetitions provides a narrow enough confidence interval while minimizing 
the number of experiments necessary.  Each of the repetitions for the same configuration 
use a different seed for the random number generator which affects the various aspects of 
the simulation including the join time, departure time, and mobility of the each UAV. 
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3.12 Analysis and Interpretation of Results 
 The analysis of the data supports the goals of this research.  Several random 
variables dictate the behavior of each individual UAV throughout the simulation.  These 
include the UAV’s join time, assigned cluster, mobility, departure time, and rejoin time.  
Thus, the data collected are random variables.  Each experiment is replicated several 
times, as indicated above, to achieve an accurate representation of the system’s typical 
performance.  Errors in the sampled data are verified to be normally distributed and 
confidence intervals are used to compare the performance of the three architectures.  If 
the confidence intervals for two architectures do not overlap they are said to have a 
significant statistical difference for the performance metric.  If the confidence intervals 
overlap, but the means are not within the part that overlaps a t-test is performed to 
determine if a statistical difference exists.  Otherwise, the architectures cannot be deemed 
statistically different and thus, one architecture cannot be said to perform better or worse 
than the other in terms of the measured performance metric. 
To allocate the variation in total keys, average rekeys, average bandwidth, and 
battery consumed, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is performed on each metric.  This 
shows if the variance in performance is due to experimental error or real differences in 
the changing factors.  In order for the results of the ANOVA to be valid, several 
assumptions must hold.  The assumptions of the ANOVA are:  the errors are randomly, 
independently, and normally distributed with a mean of zero, and have a common 
variance.  These assumptions can be verified by examining various data plots including a 
normal probability plot, a residual versus fits plot, a histogram of the residuals, and a 
residuals versus order of the data plot. 
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3.13 Summary 
This chapter discusses the methodology used to evaluate the performance of 
secure group communication architectures applied to a swarm of autonomous unmanned 
aerial vehicles UAVs.  Performance is evaluated via simulations using MatLab and is 
based on the multicast security performance metrics:  total keys, average rekeys, average 
bandwidth, and battery consumed.  A full-factorial experiment is performed on two 
different scenarios to evaluate the impact of varying the swarm size, group join rate, 
group departure rate, swarm mobility, and the selected security architecture. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and analyzes the experimental results.  First, the methods 
used to validate the architecture models are discussed in Section 4.2.  Next, the results of 
each individual performance metric for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are presented in 
Section 4.3.  Finally, an overall analysis of the results is provided in Section 4.4. 
4.2 Architecture Model Validation 
The purpose of this section is to validate the models of the architectures evaluated 
in this study.  This is accomplished by duplicating the experiments documented in 
[HuR07] and comparing the results to the original findings.   
The original experiments modeled stationary, ground, sea, and air users, each with 
different types of mobility (speed of the users) and rates of mobility (percentage of users 
that are mobile).  The three architectures (baseline, cluster, and Hubenko) are tested in 
400 different simulated scenarios, increasing the number of users in the system across the 
four different rates of mobility (1%, 10%, 25%, and 75%).  By comparing the two plots 
in Figure 7, it is seen that the results from the duplicated experiments closely match the 
results from the original experiment for the metric total keys.  The original results are 
displayed in the top plot and the duplicated experimental results are displayed below.  
The labels (a) – (d) correspond to the mobility levels, 1%, 10%, 25%, and 75%.  Each 
iteration within each the mobility category increases the number of users with the first 
iteration at 100 users and the last iteration at 1000 users. 
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Figure 7. Validation of Architecture Models via Log Total Keys 
 
Similarly, Figure 8 displays the results in terms of the metric average rekeys.  
Although average rekeys were fewer overall in the duplicated experiment, the trends and 
relationships between the three architectures closely match the original results. 
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Figure 8. Validation of Architecture Models via Average Rekeys 
 
The results convincingly validate the models of the cluster architecture and the 
Hubenko architecture used in this study.  However, as mentioned in Section 3.10, the 
baseline architecture evaluated in this study differs from the original baseline architecture 
because the original study assumed a globally dispersed group of users, whereas this 
study assumes a local group of UAVs (within the communication range of a Global 
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Hawk) as the baseline case.  Therefore, a direct comparison cannot be made to validate 
the baseline architecture used in this study. 
4.3 Results and Analysis of Performance Metrics 
This section interprets and analyzes the relevant data collected from the 
simulations.  The performances of the scenarios tested are analyzed in terms of each 
metric individually, followed by an overall performance analysis.  Results from Scenario 
1 are analyzed followed by the results from Scenario 2.  Several graphs for each metric 
are shown in the following sections.  The confidence intervals are not shown on the plots, 
because they are too narrow to be distinguished.  However, there are additional plots in 
Appendices C - I containing the 95% confidence intervals for all data discussed in this 
chapter.      
4.3.1 Analysis of Scenario 1 
 
This section analyzes the results from the Scenario 1 simulations.  This scenario 
represents a UAV swarm where UAVs randomly join the group within the first 15% or 
30% of the two hour simulation time.  A portion of the swarm (either 25% or 75%) is 
assigned as highly mobile and a portion of the swarm (either 25% or 75%) departs the 
group after random intervals.  None of the departed UAVs rejoin the group.   
4.3.1.1 Analysis of Total Keys for Scenario 1 
 
The analysis of total keys indicates the scalability of the architecture.  The lowest 
number of keys distributed for a specific combination of factors is important, but the rate 
at which the keys distributed increases as the swarm size, mobility, joins, and departures 
increase, is more important in terms of scalability.  An examination of the residual plots 
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of total keys reveals that the data does not meet all the criteria to perform an ANOVA.  
Specifically, the residuals are not normally distributed.  However, a logarithmic 
transformation of the response yields data that does meet the criteria, thus providing a 
valid ANOVA.  Figure 9 shows the log total keys versus log swarm size when 25% of the 
swarm is highly mobile.  The four plots in the figure display the data for the four 
combinations of the join rate and departure rate.  For example, the upper left hand plot 
displays the data when the join rate is set to 15% (all UAVs join the group in the first 
15% of the simulation time) and the departure rate is set to 25%.  Similarly, Figure 10 
displays log total keys versus log swarm size when 75% of the swarm is highly mobile.  
The linear relationship between the log of total keys and the log of the swarm size 
indicates the two are related by a power function.   
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Figure 9. Total Keys versus Swarm Size with 25% Mobility with a Log-Log Scale 
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Figure 10. Total Keys versus Swarm Size with 75% Mobility with a Log-Log Scale 
 
As expected, more keys are distributed in the system when the swarm size 
increases and mobility is high.  Also, as predicted, the fewest keys are distributed in the 
system with the Hubenko architecture.  The baseline and cluster architectures 
performance relative to each other vary depending on the mobility, join rate, and 
departure rate.  By visual inspection it can be seen that the Hubenko architecture has 
statistically significant differences compared to the baseline and cluster architectures.  
Also, statistically significant differences can be seen among the various swarm sizes.  
These differences are verified by the numerical data, which can be found on the detailed 
plots containing confidence intervals in Appendix D.  Though it is difficult to visually see 
significant statistical differences among the different mobility levels, the differences are 
evident when examining the confidence intervals.  Using the mean response values across 
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all factors, total keys is 86.2% less in the Hubenko architecture compared to baseline and 
89.2% less compared to the cluster architecture.   
The results of the ANOVA using the log total keys are displayed in Table 6.   The 
ANOVA uses the general linear model with the log total keys as the response and the 
swarm size, join rate, departure rate, mobility and architecture as predictors along with 
their second order interactions.  The general linear model assumes the residuals are 
independent, normally distributed, and have a zero mean.  The validity of the ANOVA 
can be confirmed by visually inspecting the residual plots in Figure 11.  The normal 
probability plot and the histogram show the residuals reasonably fit a normal distribution 
with a mean of zero.  There is some departure from normality in the tails, but the 
ANOVA is fairly robust with respect to the normality assumption.  The versus fits plot 
shows residuals evenly distributed above and below the center line with no apparent 
trends indicating the errors are independent. 
Table 6.  Results of Using an ANOVA on Log Total Keys 
Source of Variation DF Adj SS % Variation Adj ms F Ratio P 
SwarmSize 3 414.812 77.587 138.271 161681 0.000 
JoinRate 1 0.297 0.056 0.297 347 0.000 
DepRate 1 0.421 0.079 0.421 492 0.000 
Mobility 1 6.857 1.282 6.857 8017 0.000 
Architecture 2 97.979 18.326 48.989 57284 0.000 
SwarmSize*JoinRate 3 0.005 0.001 0.002 2 0.097 
SwarmSize*DepRate 3 0.046 0.009 0.015 18 0.000 
SwarmSize*Mobility 3 0.169 0.032 0.056 66 0.000 
SwarmSize*Architecture 6 3.127 0.585 0.521 609 0.000 
JoinRate*DepRate 1 0.035 0.007 0.035 41 0.000 
JoinRate*Mobility 1 0.007 0.001 0.007 9 0.003 
JoinRate*Architecture 2 0.170 0.032 0.085 99 0.000 
DepRate*Mobility 1 0.035 0.006 0.035 41 0.000 
DepRate*Architecture 2 4.577 0.856 2.289 2676 0.000 
Mobility*Architecture 2 5.479 1.024 2.739 3203 0.000 
Error 735 0.629 0.117 0.001   
Total 767 534.644 100.000    
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Figure 11.  Plots for Verifying the Assumptions of the Log Total Keys ANOVA 
 
As can be verified from Table 6, the model accounts for 99.883% of the variation 
in the response.  All first order terms and all but one of the second order terms have 
statistical significance at the 0.05 significance level.  The swarm size contributes most to 
variation in the response (77.587%) followed by the architecture (18.326%) and mobility 
(1.282%).  Although, the join rate and departure rate factors are significant, they 
contribute very little to the overall variation in the response.   
 The main effects plot for total keys is shown in Figure 12.  It can be seen that a 
larger the swarm size and higher mobility increase total keys, while the Hubenko 
Architecture decreases total keys.  Although the join rate and departure rate have 
significant effects according to their p-values, they are much smaller in comparison to the 
other factors, only contributing 0.056% and 0.079% to the variation in the response 
respectively.  Using pair-wise comparisons of the mean responses at the 0.05 level of 
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significance, each level of the swarm size as well as both levels of mobility have 
significant statistical differences from all other levels.  The Hubenko architecture is 
statistically different from the cluster and baseline architectures, but the baseline and 
cluster architectures are not statistically different from each other.  The two levels of both 
the departure rate and the join rate are not statistically different. 
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Figure 12.  Total Keys Distributed Main Effects Plot 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Analysis of Average Rekeys for Scenario 1 
 
The analysis of average rekeys reveals the efficiency of each architecture.  When 
performing an ANOVA on average rekeys, the residuals of the response data were found 
not to fit a normal distribution.  Thus, to meet the criteria for a valid ANOVA, a 
logarithmic transformation of the response data is necessary.  Similar to the plots 
displayed in the previous section, Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the log average rekeys 
versus log swarm size at the 25% and 75% mobility levels respectively.   
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Figure 13. Average Rekeys versus Swarm Size with 25% Mobility with a Log-Log Scale 
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Figure 14. Average Rekeys versus Swarm Size with 75% Mobility with a Log-Log Scale 
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The effects of the factors are similar to those described in the previous section.  
By visual inspection it can be seen that the Hubenko architecture has significant 
statistical differences compared to the baseline and cluster architectures and has the 
lowest average rekeys in all factor combinations.  Also, significant statistical differences 
can be seen among the various swarm sizes and the two mobility levels.  These 
differences are verified by the numerical data as well, which can been seen on the 
detailed plots containing confidence intervals shown in Appendix E.  Using the mean 
response values across all factor levels, average rekeys is 84.9% less in the Hubenko 
architecture compared to the baseline and 87.1% compared to the cluster architecture. 
The results of the ANOVA using the log average rekeys are displayed in Table 7.   
The ANOVA uses the general linear model with average rekeys as the response and the 
swarm size, join rate, departure rate, mobility and architecture as predictors along with 
their second order and some third order interactions.   
 Table 7.  Results of Using an ANOVA on Log Average Rekeys 
Source of Variation DF Adj SS % Variation Adj ms F Ratio P 
SwarmSize 3 85.686 41.271 28.5622 113181.04 0.000 
JoinRate 1 0.049 0.024 0.0490 194.22 0.000 
DepRate 1 2.995 1.443 2.9950 11867.90 0.000 
Mobility 1 6.742 3.247 6.7423 26717.09 0.000 
Architecture 2 97.978 47.191 48.9888 194124.15 0.000 
SwarmSize*JoinRate 3 0.002 0.001 0.0007 2.77 0.041 
SwarmSize*DepRate 3 0.059 0.029 0.0197 78.23 0.000 
SwarmSize*Mobility 3 0.138 0.067 0.0461 182.87 0.000 
SwarmSize*Architecture 6 3.127 1.506 0.5211 2065.04 0.000 
JoinRate*DepRate 1 0.000 0.000 0.0004 1.57 0.211 
JoinRate*Mobility 1 0.004 0.002 0.0042 16.62 0.000 
JoinRate*Architecture 2 0.170 0.082 0.0851 337.22 0.000 
DepRate*Mobility 1 0.046 0.022 0.0463 183.55 0.000 
DepRate*Architecture 2 4.577 2.205 2.2887 9069.44 0.000 
Mobility*Architecture 2 5.485 2.642 2.7423 10866.80 0.000 
SwarmSize*JoinRate*Mobility 3 0.002 0.001 0.0008 2.97 0.031 
SwarmSize*JoinRate*Architecture 6 0.006 0.003 0.0010 3.97 0.001 
SwarmSize*DepRate*Architecture 6 0.106 0.051 0.0176 69.79 0.000 
SwarmSize*Mobility*Architecture 6 0.231 0.111 0.0385 152.52 0.000 
JoinRate*DepRate*Architecture 2 0.006 0.003 0.0032 12.72 0.000 
JoinRate*Mobility*Architecture 2 0.004 0.002 0.0018 7.06 0.001 
DepRate*Mobility*Architecture 2 0.027 0.013 0.0134 53.12 0.000 
Error 708 0.179 0.086 0.0003 
Total 767 207.620 
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The validity of the ANOVA can be confirmed by visually inspecting the residual plots in 
Figure 15.   
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Figure 15.  Plots for Verifying the Assumptions of the Log Average Rekeys ANOVA 
 
 Table 7 indicates that the computed model accounts for 99.914% of the variation 
in average rekeys with all first order, and many second and third order terms having 
statistical significance at the 0.05 significance level.  For this response the architecture 
contributes most to the variation (47.191%), followed by the swarm size (41.271%).  The 
mobility (3.247%) contributes the third most to the variation in the response.  
 The main effects plot for the average rekeys per UAV is shown in Figure 16.  A 
larger swarm size and higher mobility increases average rekeys, while the Hubenko 
Architecture decreases average rekeys, which confirms the findings from the plots above.  
The join rate has little effect, while a higher departure rate suggests higher average 
rekeys.  Using pair-wise comparisons of the mean responses at the 0.05 level of 
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significance, each level of the swarm size as well as both levels of mobility have 
significant statistical differences from all other levels.  The Hubenko architecture is 
statistically different from the cluster and baseline architectures, but the baseline and 
cluster architectures are not statistically different from each other.  The two levels of the 
join rate are not statistically different.  Although it appears departure rate levels are 
statistical different the pair-wise comparison does not confirm this. 
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Figure 16.  Average Rekeys per UAV Main Effects Plot 
 
 
4.3.2 Analysis of Scenario 2 
  
This section analyzes the results from the Scenario 2 simulations.  Since the join 
rate has little effect on the responses compared to the other factors and the departure rate 
is not applicable because there are continuous departures, only three factors (swarm size, 
mobility, and architecture) are varied.  However, more levels are added to the swarm size 
and swarm mobility factors, and two additional metrics are measured (average bandwidth 
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and battery consumed).  The calculations used to measure average bandwidth and battery 
consumed can be found in Appendices A and B respectively.   
Recall that, Scenario 2 represents a swarm of UAVs that needs to be sustained for 
a prolonged period of time.  Thus, this scenario simulates UAVs joining, departing, and 
rejoining the swarm over a 12 hour period.  Each individual UAV’s join, departure, and 
rejoin times are based on random variables and a randomly assigned battery life ranging 
from 30 minutes to 3 hours.  The percentage of UAVs assigned as highly mobile is the 
same as Scenario 1, but 50% and 90% mobility levels are tested as well. 
4.3.2.1 Analysis of Total Keys for Scenario 2 
 
 As in Scenario 1, an examination of the residual plots of total keys reveals that the 
data does not meet all the criteria to perform an ANOVA.  Specifically, the residuals do 
not fit a normal distribution.  However, a logarithmic transformation of the response 
yields data that does meet the criteria, thus providing a valid ANOVA.  Figure 17 
contains four plots displaying the log total keys versus log swarm size.  Each plot 
represents a different mobility level.  For example, the plot in the upper left hand corner 
contains data from simulations run with the 25% of the swarm being highly mobile.  As 
with the rest of the Scenario 2 plots, the confidence intervals are not shown because they 
are too narrow to be distinguishable.  Additional plots containing 95% confidence 
intervals can be found in Appendix F.   
As expected, total keys increases as the swarm size increases and the fewest keys 
are distributed in the Hubenko architecture.  It is evident that there are statistically 
significant differences among the three architectures and the various swarm sizes.  These 
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differences are also verified by the numerical data displayed on the graphs in Appendix 
F.   
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Figure 17.  Total Keys versus Swarm Size with a Log-Log Scale 
 
Unlike Scenario 1, the cluster architecture outperforms the baseline architecture in 
every situation which reveals the negative impact departures and rejoins have on the 
baseline architecture.  The cluster architecture and Hubenko architecture are better 
designed to handle this.  The mobility rate does appear to affect the cluster architecture, 
however only the 25% and 90% levels are significantly different when the data is left 
ungrouped.  The mobility levels are significantly different from all other mobility levels 
when the data is grouped by architecture and swarm size for both the cluster and the 
Hubenko architecture.  Using the mean response values across all factors, 87.3% less 
keys are distributed in the Hubenko architecture compared to the baseline, and 80.5% less 
keys are distributed compared to the cluster architecture.   
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The results of the ANOVA using the log total keys are displayed in Table 8.   The 
validity of the ANOVA can be confirmed by visually inspecting the residual plots in 
Figure 18.   
Table 8.  Results of Using an ANOVA on Log Total Keys 
Source of Variation DF Adj SS % Variation Adj MS F Ratio P 
Swarm Size 4 1041.807 86.21 260.452 1850673.19 0.000 
Mobility 3 5.252 0.43 1.751 12438.89 0.000 
Architecture 2 153.14 12.67 76.570 544079.53 0.000 
Swarm Size*Mobility 12 0.147 0.01 0.012 87.05 0.000 
Swarm Size*Architecture 8 2.035 0.17 0.254 1807.63 0.000 
Mobility*Architecture 6 5.725 0.48 0.954 6780.28 0.000 
Swarm Size*Mobility*Architecture 24 0.197 0.02 0.008 58.25 0.000 
Error 1140 0.16 0.01 0.000 
Total 1199 1208.463 
 
 
0.0500.0250.000-0.025-0.050
99.99
99
90
50
10
1
0.01
Residual
Pe
rc
en
t
76543
0.050
0.025
0.000
-0.025
-0.050
Fitted Value
R
es
id
ua
l
0.0450.0300.0150.000-0.015-0.030-0.045
300
200
100
0
Residual
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
12
00
11
00
10
0090
0
80
0
70
0
60
0
50
0
40
0
30
0
20
0
10
01
0.050
0.025
0.000
-0.025
-0.050
Observation Order
R
es
id
ua
l
Normal Probability Plot Versus Fits
Histogram Versus Order
 
Figure 18. Plots for Verifying the Assumptions of the Log Total Keys ANOVA 
 
 As can be verified from Table 8, the model accounts for 99.99% of the variation 
in the log total keys with all first, second, and third order terms having statistical 
significance at the 0.05 significance level.  The swarm size contributes most to variation 
in the response (86.21%) followed by the architecture (12.67%).  Although all other 
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terms are significant according to the model, their percent variation in the response is less 
than 1% each. 
The main effects plot for total keys is shown in Figure 19.  A larger swarm size 
and higher mobility increases total keys, while the Hubenko Architecture decreases total 
keys.  A pair-wise comparison of the mean responses at the 0.05 level of significance 
shows each level of the swarm size has significant statistical differences from all other 
levels.  Each architecture is also significantly different from all other architectures.  
Although the mean increases as the percentage of highly mobile users increases, none of 
the mobility rate levels are statistically different from any other levels when the data is 
left ungrouped. 
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Figure 19.  Main Effects Plot for Total Keys  
 
4.3.2.2 Analysis of Average Rekeys for Scenario 2 
 
An examination of the residual plots of average rekeys reveals that the data does 
not meet all the criteria to perform an ANOVA.  Specifically, the residuals of the 
response data do not fit a normal distribution.  Thus, to meet the criteria to perform a 
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valid ANOVA a logarithmic transformation of the response data is necessary.  Error! 
Reference source not found. contains four plots displaying the log average rekeys 
versus log swarm size, with each plot representing a different mobility level.  Additional 
plots containing 95% confidence intervals can be found in Appendix G.   
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Figure 20.  Average Rekeys versus Swarm Size with Log-Log Scale 
 
Statistically significant differences can be seen among the three architectures and 
the various swarm sizes.  These differences are verified by the numerical data from 
Appendix G.  According to the numerical data, a UAV in the Hubenko architecture 
rekeys an average of 87.3% less than a UAV in the baseline architecture.  Similarly, a 
UAV in the Hubenko architecture rekeys an average of 79.9% less than a UAV in the 
cluster architecture. 
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The results of the ANOVA using the log average rekeys are displayed in Table 
Table 9.   The assumptions of the ANOVA can be confirmed by visually inspecting the 
residual plots in Figure 21.    
 Table 9.  Results of Using an ANOVA on Log Average Rekeys 
Source of Variation DF Adj SS % Variation Adj MS F Ratio P 
Swarm Size 4 228.2673 57.79 57.0668 229498.16 0.000 
Mobility 3 5.2682 1.33 1.7561 7062.09 0.000 
Architecture 2 153.0614 38.75 76.5307 307773.42 0.000 
Swarm Size*Mobility 12 0.1549 0.04 0.0129 51.90 0.000 
Swarm Size*Architecture 8 2.0506 0.52 0.2563 1030.83 0.000 
Mobility*Architecture 6 5.7220 1.45 0.9537 3835.25 0.000 
Swarm Size*Mobility*Architecture 24 0.1955 0.05 0.0081 32.75 0.000 
Error 1140 0.2835 0.07 0.000 
Total 1199 395.0033 
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Figure 21.  Plots for Verifying the Assumptions of the Log Average Rekeys ANOVA 
 
As can be verified from Table 9, the model accounts for 99.93% of the variation 
in the log average rekeys with all first, second, and third order terms having statistical 
significance at the 0.05 significance level.  The swarm size contributes most to variation 
in the response (57.79%) followed by the architecture (38.75%), the second order 
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interaction between mobility and architecture (1.45%), and mobility (1.33%).  Although 
significant, all other terms contribute less than 1% each to the variation in the response. 
The main effects plot for average rekeys is shown in Figure 22.  A larger swarm 
size and higher mobility increases average rekeys, while the Hubenko architecture 
reduces average rekeys.  Using pair-wise comparisons of the mean responses at the 0.05 
level of significance, each level of the swarm size has significant statistical differences 
from all other levels.  Each architecture also has significant statistical differences from all 
other architectures.  The 25% mobility level and 90% mobility level are the only mobility 
levels with significant statistical differences.   
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Figure 22.  Main Effects Plot for Average Rekeys Per UAV 
 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Analysis of Average Bandwidth for Scenario 2 
 
To meet the criteria to perform a valid ANOVA a logarithmic transformation of 
the response data is necessary.  Figure 23 contains four plots displaying the log average 
bandwidth versus log swarm size, with each plot representing a different mobility level.  
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This displays the linear relationship between log average bandwidth and log swarm size.  
Additional plots containing 95% confidence intervals are found in Appendix H.  The 
formulas and assumptions used to calculate average bandwidth are presented in 
Appendix A.   
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Figure 23.  Average Bandwidth versus Swarm Size with Log-Log Scale 
 
The plots indicate a significant statistical difference among the three architectures 
and the various swarm sizes.  These differences are verified by the numerical data, which 
can be found on the plots in Appendix H.  Without grouping by the other factors, none of 
the mobility levels are statistically different.   
In terms of reducing the use of limited resources, such as bandwidth, the power of 
the Hubenko architecture is evident.  At the 25% mobility level both the cluster and 
Hubenko architecture scale well, relative to the baseline, as the swarm size increases.  
However, once mobility increases, the bandwidth used by the cluster architecture nears 
that of the baseline, while the Hubenko architecture is minimally affected.  At the 90% 
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mobility level the Hubenko architecture uses an average of 85.3% less average 
bandwidth than the cluster architecture and 87.3% less than the baseline architecture.  
The results of the ANOVA using the log average bandwidth are displayed in 
Table 10.  The validity of the ANOVA is confirmed by visually inspecting the residual 
plots in Figure 24.   
  
Table 10.  Results of Using an ANOVA on Log Average Bandwidth 
Source of Variation DF Adj SS % Variation Adj MS F Ratio P 
SwarmSize 4 1041.807 86.21 260.455 1850673.19 0.000 
Mobility 3 5.252 0.43 1.751 12438.89 0.000 
Architecture 2 153.137 12.67 76.568 544079.53 0.000 
SwarmSize*Mobility 12 0.147 0.01 0.012 87.05 0.000 
SwarmSize*Architecture 8 2.036 0.17 0.254 1807.63 0.000 
Mobility*Architecture 6 5.725 0.48 0.954 6780.28 0.000 
SwarmSize*Mobility*Architecture 24 0.197 0.02 0.008 58.25 0.000 
Error 1140 0.161 0.01 0.000 
Total 1199 1208.463 
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Figure 24. Plots for Verifying the Assumptions of the Log Average Bandwidth ANOVA 
 
The model accounts for 99.99% of the variation in the log average bandwidth 
with all first, second, and third order terms having statistical significance at the 0.05 
significance level.  The swarm size contributes most to variation in the response 
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(86.21%) followed by the architecture (12.67%).  Although all other terms are significant 
according to the model, their percent variation in the response is less than 1% each. 
The main effects plot for average bandwidth is shown in Figure 25.  Here again, a 
larger swarm size and higher mobility increases average bandwidth, while the Hubenko 
architecture reduces the amount of bandwidth used.  Using pair-wise comparisons of the 
mean responses at the 0.05 level of significance, each level of the swarm size has 
significant statistical differences from all other levels.  Each architecture is significantly 
different from all other architectures.  None of the mobility rate levels are statistically 
different from any of the other levels when the data is left ungrouped.  However, when 
grouped by architecture and swarm size, each mobility level for the Hubenko and cluster 
architecture has significant statistical differences from all other levels as verified in each 
of the plots in Appendix H.   
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Figure 25. Main Effects Plot for Average Bandwidth 
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4.3.2.4 Analysis of Average Percentage of Battery Consumed to Rekey 
 
Figure 26 contains four plots displaying battery consumed versus the swarm size, 
with each plot representing a different mobility level.  Additional plots containing 95% 
confidence intervals can be found in Appendix I.  The formulas and assumptions used to 
calculate battery consumed are presented in Appendix B.   
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Figure 26.  Battery Consumed versus Swarm Size 
 
The plots indicate a statistically significant difference among the three 
architectures and the various swarm sizes.  These differences are verified by the 
numerical data displayed in the graphs in Appendix I.  Aside from differences in the 
cluster architecture, it is difficult to visually determine differences in the mobility levels. 
Interestingly, the baseline architecture outperforms the cluster architecture in terms of the 
response.  In the baseline architecture the Global Hawk uses fuel, not batteries and rekeys 
all of the swarm members.  Thus, battery is only consumed when a swarm member 
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receives a new key.  However, in the cluster and Hubenko architectures, the keys are 
distributed by cluster leaders, which are swarm members themselves, and thus battery is 
consumed to both transmit and receive a key.   
Although the results appear insignificant because the percentage of battery 
consumed is so small, the relative performance differences among the architectures are 
very significant.  Not included in the simulation are routing, lost packets, and the higher 
level protocols that provide reliability.  Thus, the simplest case is assumed to rekey the 
swarm:  one packet transmitted to, and received by each swarm member containing the 
key.  When routing and reliable protocols are factored into the experiments battery 
consumed will undoubtedly increase.  Thus, the rate at which the percentage of battery 
consumed increases as the swarm size and mobility increase provides more useful 
information.  Figure 26 shows the growth rate of the response versus swarm size and 
mobility is the lowest in the Hubenko architecture. 
The results of the ANOVA using battery consumed are displayed in  Table 11.   
The validity of the ANOVA can be confirmed by visually inspecting the residual plots in 
Figure 27.    
 Table 11. Results of Using an ANOVA on Battery Consumed 
Source of Variation DF Adj SS % Variation Adj MS F Ratio P 
Swarm Size 4 0.0017230 48.33 0.0004308 615782.46 0.000 
Mobility 3 0.0000844 2.37 0.0000281 40216.68 0.000 
Architecture 2 0.0007733 21.69 0.0003866 552714.19 0.000 
Swarm Size*Mobility 12 0.0000611 1.71 0.0000051 7278.48 0.000 
Swarm Size*Architecture 8 0.0006470 18.15 0.0000809 115607.43 0.000 
Mobility*Architecture 6 0.0001555 4.36 0.0000259 37039.88 0.000 
Swarm Size*Mobility*Architecture 24 0.0001202 3.37 0.0000050 7158.87 0.000 
Error 1140 0.0000008 0.02 0.0000000 
Total 1199 0.0035652 
 
The model in Table 11 accounts for 99.98% of the variation in battery consumed 
with all first, second, and third order terms having statistical significance at the 0.05 
significance level.  All factors and their interactions, aside from error, account for at least 
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one percent of the variation in the response.  The swarm size contributes most to variation 
in the response (48.33%) followed by the architecture (21.69%) and the second order 
interaction between swarm size and architecture (18.15%).   
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Figure 27. Plots for Verifying the Assumptions of the Battery Consumed ANOVA 
 
The main effects plot for battery consumed is shown in Figure 28.  It can be seen 
a larger swarm size and higher mobility increases battery consumed, while the Hubenko 
Architecture decreases battery consumed.  Using pair-wise comparisons of the mean 
responses at the 0.05 level of significance, each level of the swarm size has significant 
statistical differences from all other levels.  Also, each architecture has significant 
statistical differences from all other architectures.  The 25% mobility level is the only 
mobility level with significant statistical differences from all other levels.  
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Figure 28.  Main Effects Plot for Battery Consumed 
 
4.3 Overall Analysis 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from the simulations conducted.  Most 
importantly, the statistical analysis of the data confirms the hypothesis.  The Hubenko 
architecture provides statistically significant performance gains over the commonly used 
baseline and cluster multicast security architectures.  By taking advantage of spatial 
clustering to decrease the negative performance impact of joins and departures, and 
integrating GACA-GKM to decrease the negative performance impact of highly mobile 
UAVs, the Hubenko architecture outperforms the baseline and cluster architectures in all 
of the conducted experiments.  Using the data from both scenarios, the following 
summarizes the performance gains achieved by the Hubenko architecture compared to 
the baseline architecture (includes the smallest and highest gains across all 
configurations):    
• 57.8 - 87.6% less total keys distributed 
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• 59.6 - 87.9% less rekeys per UAV 
• 73.0 - 87.9% less bandwidth used to rekey 
• 16.9 - 58.8% less battery consumed to rekey 
Similarly, the following summarizes the performance gains achieved by the 
Hubenko architecture compared to the cluster architecture (ranging from the smallest to 
the highest gains across all configurations):    
• 55.2 - 94.9% less total keys distributed 
• 59.0 – 94.8% less rekeys per UAV 
• 55.2 – 85.4% less bandwidth used to rekey 
• 54.3 – 85.4% less battery consumed to rekey 
It is also important to realize these performance gains coincide with an overall 
improvement in the security of the system via GACs and independent SEKs for each 
cluster. 
 Other conclusions that can be drawn from the overall analysis of the simulations 
are the significance and effects of the factors.  First, comparing the data from the two 
scenarios, it can be seen that the longer simulation time, and the ability of UAVs to 
continuously depart and rejoin the swarm significantly increases total keys and average 
rekeys.  For example, if the configurations from Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are compared 
when the swarm size is 500 and mobility is at 75%, total keys in the baseline case 
increases over 14 times from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2.  After accounting for the 
difference in simulation length by dividing total keys by the number of hours, total keys 
in the baseline increase 2.02 times per hour.  The Hubenko and cluster architectures see 
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similar, but smaller, increases as well (about a 1.86 and 1.35 times per hour increase 
respectively).  Similar trends can also be seen for average rekeys. 
As expected, the swarm size significantly contributes to the variation in all of the 
responses, causing the most variation in all but one of the measured responses.  The 
architecture is the second largest contributing factor in all of the responses, except for 
one, where it is the largest.  As discussed previously, the join rate is significant according 
to the p-value from the general linear model, but it contributes very little to the variation 
in the measured responses.  The mobility of the swarm has no effect on the baseline 
architecture, but has significant effects in both the Hubenko and cluster architectures. 
4.4 Summary  
 This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected from the simulations of three 
different security architectures applied a swarm of autonomous UAVs.  The validation of 
the simulated architecture models is presented followed by a statistical analysis of both 
scenarios in terms of each performance metric.  Finally, an overall analysis and 
discussion of the results is provided. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter summarizes the overall conclusions of the research.  Section 5.2 
presents the conclusions from the experimental results.  The significance of this research 
is discussed in Section 5.3.  Finally, Section 5.4 describes recommendations for areas of 
future research. 
5.2 Conclusions of Research 
The Hubenko architecture can successfully be applied to a swarm of autonomous 
UAVs.  Furthermore, the Hubenko architecture significantly outperforms the two other 
security architectures studied in terms of reducing total keys, average rekeys, average 
bandwidth, and battery consumed.  By taking advantage of spatial clustering to decrease 
the negative performance impact of joins and departures, and integrating GACA-GKM to 
decrease the negative performance impact of highly mobile UAVs, the Hubenko 
architecture is a very efficient and scalable architecture. 
The largest performance gains are seen in large, highly mobile swarms, in which 
UAVs continuously join and depart the group.  In this type of environment the Hubenko 
architecture reduces the total keys distributed, average rekeys per UAV, average 
bandwidth used to rekey up to 88% compared to the baseline architecture.  The average 
percentage of battery consumed is reduced up to 59% compared to the baseline.  
In most cases, statistical analysis of the metrics found swarm size to be the largest 
factor contributing to the variation in the responses, followed by the architecture, and 
mobility.  The join rate and departure rate significantly affect the response but contribute 
little to the variation in the response relative to the other factors. 
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5.3 Significance of Research 
 This research is the first to provide a practical and direct application of the 
Hubenko architecture, which was broadly designed for securing group communication in 
the GIG.  It is also among the first to address secure group communication in an 
autonomous UAV swarm.  Through careful research and simulation, this study shows the 
Hubenko architecture is not only a viable solution to securing group communication in an 
autonomous UAV swarm, but a very efficient and scalable solution as well.  With this 
added security component, a swarm of autonomous UAVs can provide a unique and 
powerful net-centric asset to support the warfighter.  This research also tests the Hubenko 
architecture under more realistic scenarios, further validating its potential as an efficient 
and scalable group communication security architecture.   
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
The Hubenko architecture should be tested in environments such as OPNET 
where network constraints such as delay, packet loss, and retransmissions can be 
accurately modeled.  In addition multicast ad hoc routing protocols should be 
investigated to find the best performance for specific scenarios. 
Recent research efforts have developed mobility models such as the random 
waypoint model to simulate UAV swarms performing a search [CaB02].  Applying the 
Hubenko architecture to those studies would be useful.  In addition to the more realistic 
model of swarm’s mobility, the performance impact of the Hubenko architecture on the 
search could be evaluated.   
This study assumed a simple pair-wise rekeying distribution protocol.  However, 
any rekeying protocol could be used with the Hubenko architecture.  Evaluating the best 
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rekeying distribution protocol, such as pair-wise rekeying, distributed, secure lock, and 
hierarchical trees in an autonomous UAV swarm performing a search would be very 
beneficial. 
Finally, research could further expand the scenarios herein to include other assets 
in the GIG, which communicate with a UAV swarm.  These include ground troops, 
wireless sensor networks, satellites, or other air assets.  This would call for more levels in 
the hierarchy of the Hubenko architecture and would provide an interesting test of the 
robustness of the architecture. 
5.5 Summary  
 This chapter presented the conclusions of this research.  The significance of the 
research was discussed as well as several recommendations for future research. 
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Appendix A. Bandwidth Used to Rekey Calculations 
 
Bandwidth is a limited resource in MANETs such as a swarm of UAVs.  
Although maintaining security of the swarm is an important necessity, it is not usually the 
primary function of the swarm’s communication and should therefore not dominate the 
bandwidth.  Thus, bandwidth used to rekey is an important metric when considering 
which security architecture to implement.   
A specific encryption scheme or algorithm has not been selected, as it is beyond 
the scope of this work.  The best encryption scheme depends on the security needs of the 
application and the capabilities of the UAVs.  However, for the purpose of this study a 
key length of 256 bits is chosen to measure the bandwidth used to rekey.  A 256 bit key is 
a standard key length in the popular Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).  Although 
128 bit length key is more commonly implemented, the larger key length is chosen to 
model the case where extra security is needed.  As a result, the size of the network layer 
packet used to distribute the group secret key on a rekey is 688 bits as shown below: 
Packet Size = MAC Header + CRC + Encryption Key + IP Header  
= 240 bits + 32 bits + 256 bits + 160 bits 
 = 688 bits  
The average bandwidth used to rekey is calculated by summing all the rekeys for 
each UAV performed over the simulation period multiplied by the packet size and 
divided by the number of seconds in the simulation.  This gives the average bits per 
second (bps).  This calculation assumes that each UAV is rekeyed directly by the cluster 
leader or Global Hawk, in the case of the baseline architecture, (the packets are not 
transmitted through intermediary UAVs).  Also, this calculation only takes the packet 
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with the encryption key into account (management or acknowledgement packets are not 
used in the calculation because they depend the specific protocols used).  This calculation 
also assumes a pair-wise rekey between the cluster leader (or Global Hawk) and each 
UAV, which results in one separate message for each UAV (n messages).  An alternative 
to pair-wise rekeying and sending n messages is to multicast a single message containing 
n copies of the new group key each encrypted with a different members pair-wise key.  
This alternative results in only one message sent, however the message is of size O(n).  
Again, any rekeying scheme can be adapted depending on the needs of the application. 
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Appendix B. Battery Consumed to Rekey Calculations 
 
This section outlines the calculations used to measure the percentage of battery 
consumed to rekey (battery consumed) and the necessary assumptions.  The same 
assumptions used to calculate average bandwidth, as outlined in the Appendix G, are also 
applied to calculate battery consumed.  In addition, assumptions about the battery and 
radio are necessary.   
The representative battery chosen for the simulations is the Thunder Power 
Lithium Poly battery, which has a usable voltage range from 14 to 16.7 V, and a 4200 
mA-hr capacity [Gru07].  This battery is currently being used to power UAVs for 
swarming applications [Gru07].  The representative radio chosen for the simulations is 
the Ubiquiti Networks SuperRange9 radio, which is also currently being used in 
conjunction with the selected battery in UAV research [Gru07].  The SuperRange9 is a 
900 MHz wireless radio, which features up to 700 mW of output power, -88 dBm of 
receive sensitivity performance (for the 11Mbps data rate), and has proven non-line-of 
sight distances over 20km [Ubi07].  The current draw to transmit and receive are 1200 
mA and 500 mA respectively [Ubi07].  The range and capabilities of the selected radio 
and battery make the assumed communication ranges for the three architectures viable.   
With the battery and radio selected, there is enough information to calculate 
battery consumed.  First, the energy consumed to rekey is found, which consists of the 
energy consumed to transmit the rekey packet and the energy consumed to receive the 
rekey packet.  The equations used to calculate the energy consumed to receive and 
transmit are shown in Equation B.1 and Equation B.2 respectively [Jor06].   
 
86 
688 500 0.0000087
3600 3600 11
R R
Rx
b d mAE m
s sr Mbps
hr hr
× A hr×= = =⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
−                   (B.1) 
 
688 1200 0.0000208
3600 3600 11
T T
Tx
b d mAE m
s sr Mbps
hr hr
× A hr×= = =⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
−                    (B.2) 
The symbols used in the equations are defined in Table 12.   
Table 12. Energy Consumption Symbols 
RxE  Energy Consumed from Receiving (mA-hr) 
TxE  Energy Consumed from Transmitting (mA-hr) 
Tb  Bits Transmitted 
Rb  Bits Received 
Td  Current Draw from Transmitting (mA-hr) 
Rd  Current Draw from Transmitting (mA-hr) 
r  Data Rate (bits/second) 
 
The bits transmitted and received are the number of bits in the rekey packet (688).  The 
current draw from transmitting and receiving are taken from the radio’s datasheet and the 
data rate is assumed to be 11 Mbps, which is the maximum data rate for IEEE 802.11b. 
Then, the results of Equations B.1 and B.2 are divided by the battery capacity to get a 
percentage of battery consumed to receive a rekey packet and transmit a rekey packet.   
 
% of Battery consumed to receive one key:  0.0000087 100 0.000000207%
4200
mA hr
mA
− × =  
 
 
% of Battery consumed to transmit one key:  0.00000208 100 0.000000496%
4200
mA hr
mA
− × =  
These equations are used in the simulation to calculate an overall average percentage of 
battery consumed by a UAV to rekey during the simulation period. 
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Appendix C. Rekey Time Interval Considerations 
In this study, the rekey time interval is defined to be the length of time between 
system checks for events, such as a join or departure, which create the need for a rekey 
operation.  The shorter the rekey time interval, the more secure the system will be.  
However, short rekey time intervals also increase the security overhead and overall traffic 
in the system.  For example, if the rekey time interval is set to 60 seconds, a UAV could 
continue to receive up to 60 seconds of multicast traffic after it has been evicted 
(depending the point during the rekey interval the eviction occurred).  If the rekey 
interval is set to one tenth of a second, the amount of multicast traffic received after an 
eviction would be significantly less (600 times less).   
The rekey interval also affects the amount traffic in the system associated with 
rekeying.  Using the same example, during the 60 seconds of elapsed time their may have 
been 10 events that would have triggered several rekey operations, but because the 
interval is 60 seconds, only one rekey operation would occur at the end of the interval.  
With the rekey interval at one tenth of a second all 10 rekey operations would trigger a 
rekey operation, assuming they were separated by at least one tenth of a second, creating 
10 times the traffic in the system. 
Therefore, the rekey time interval needs to balance both security requirements and 
system constraints such as bandwidth and processing power.  For the highest security 
levels the rekey time interval would be set to zero, meaning virtual real-time rekey 
operations would occur. 
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Appendix D. Additional Total Keys Distributed Plots for Scenario 1 
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Figure 29.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 40 and 25% Mobility 
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Figure 30.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 40 and 75% Mobility 
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Figure 31.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 100 and 25% Mobility 
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Figure 32.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 100 and 75% Mobility 
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Figure 33.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 200 and 25% Mobility 
 
 
HubenkoClusterBaseline
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
HubenkoClusterBaseline HubenkoClusterBaseline HubenkoClusterBaseline
15%, 25%
Architecture
T
ot
al
 K
ey
s
15%, 75% 30%, 25% 30%, 75%
5215.5
5314.25
75510.9
77701.6
25690
26918.8
5366.28
5476.22
42115.5
45458
34511.5
35222.8
4918.88
5058.62
64893.3
67860.7
25832.7
26990.5
4775.37
4988.88
30808
33258.5
32056.8
33421.4
95% CI for the Mean
SwarmSize = 200, Mobility = 75%
Panel variables: Group Join Rate, Group Departure Rate
 
Figure 34.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 200 and 75% Mobility 
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Figure 35.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 500 and 25% Mobility 
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Figure 36.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 500 and 75% Mobility 
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Appendix E. Additional Average Rekey Plots for Scenario 1 
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Figure 37.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 40 and 25% 
Mobility 
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Figure 38.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 40 and 75% 
Mobility 
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Figure 39.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 100 and 25% 
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Figure 40.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 100 and 75% 
Mobility 
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Figure 41.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 200 and 25% 
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Figure 42.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 200 and 75% 
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Figure 43.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 500 and 25% 
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Figure 44.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 500 and 75% 
Mobility 
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Appendix F. Additional Total Keys Distributed Plots for Scenario 2 
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Figure 45.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 40 
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Figure 46.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 100 
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Figure 47.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 200 
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Figure 48.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 500 
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Figure 49.  Total Keys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 100 
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Appendix G. Additional Average Rekey Plots for Scenario 2 
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Figure 50.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 40 
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Figure 51.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 100 
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Figure 52.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 200 
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Figure 53.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 500 
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Figure 54.  Average Rekeys versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 1000 
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Appendix H. Additional Average Bandwidth Plots for Scenario 2 
HubenkoClusterBaseline
300
250
200
150
100
50
HubenkoClusterBaseline HubenkoClusterBaseline HubenkoClusterBaseline
25
Architecture
A
ve
ra
ge
 B
an
dw
id
th
 (b
ps
)
50 75 90
42.5647
43.9099
92.855
97.9726
265.722
274.531
52.9818
55.1138
157.913
165.568
263.002
271.46
64.6286
65.9449
215.3
226.552
266.533
273.92
72.3112
73.3728
252.881
268.949
266.152
274.141
95% CI for the Mean
Swarm Size = 40
Panel variable: Percent Mobile
 
Figure 55.  Average Bandwidth versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 40 
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Figure 56.  Average Bandwidth versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 100 
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Figure 57.  Average Bandwidth versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 200 
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Figure 58.  Average Bandwidth versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 500 
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Figure 59.  Average Bandwidth versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 1000 
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Appendix I. Additional Battery Consumed Plots for Scenario 2 
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Figure 60.  Battery Consumed versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 40 
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Figure 61.  Battery Consumed versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 100 
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Figure 62.  Battery Consumed versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 200 
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Figure 63.  Battery Consumed versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 500 
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Figure 64.  Battery Consumed versus Architecture with Swarm Size of 1000 
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